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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 78A-3-102(3)(j)(West 2009) and 78A-4-
103 (2) (a) (West 2009) . 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE / PRESERVATION 
Did the District Court err by broadly construing the 
term xxto irrigate land" as used in the property tax 
exemption in article XIII, section 3(1)(i) of the Utah 
Constitution to include non-agricultural purposes? 
This issue was preserved by Summit County in its brief 
before the District Court and by the Utah State Tax 
Commission (the "Commission") in its final order. (R. 1573; 
R. 1577.) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
The District Court's interpretation of a constitutional 
provision is a question of law. The correction of error 
standard, with no deference accorded to the district court, 
applies to questions of law. See Nebeker v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'n, 2001 UT 74, f 11, 34 P.3d 180. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i) (West 2009).x 
(1) The following are exempt from property tax: 
~k -k -k 
(i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping plants, 
ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power plants, and 
transmission lines to the extent owned and used by 
an individual or corporation to irrigate land that 
is: 
(i) within the State; and 
(ii) owned by the individual or 
corporation, or by an individual member of 
the corporation. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (West Supp. 2009).2 
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power 
plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes, 
and flumes owned and used by individuals or 
corporations for irrigating land within the state 
owned by those individuals or corporations, or by 
the individual members of the corporation, are 
exempt from taxation to the extent that they are 
owned and used for irrigation purposes. 
1
 This constitutional provision has been non-
substantively modified during the years in question, 1996 
through 2000. The modifications are illustrated below. Since 
the changes were not substantive, the current constitutional 
provision is used. 
2
 Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 will be superseded on 
01/01/11 if the constitutional amendment proposed by H.J.R. 
2, 2010 is passed. 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final judgment of the District 
Court, which reviewed a final decision of the Commission. 
The District Court relied on the factual record made in the 
proceeding before the Commission. (R. 2107.) 
The Commission issued an Order Granting Partial Summary 
Judgment on February 15, 2002. (See Addendum A.) The 
Commission held, as a matter of law, that the property of 
Appellee Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water''), 
consisting of a water distribution system of pipes, pumps 
and equipment, did not qualify for the irrigation exemption 
from property tax under art. XIII, section 3(1)(i) of the 
Utah Constitution. The Commission concluded that the 
irrigation exemption was limited to property used to 
irrigate land for agricultural purposes and did not apply to 
non-agricultural purposes such as "watering lawns, 
ornamental flowers, and shrubs . . . ." (Addendum A, p. 3.) 
On January 29, 2003, the Commission issued its Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision that 
addressed the remaining issues. (See Addendum B.) This 
decision held that the property of Summit Water was not 
3 
subject to double taxation and that it had been omitted from 
the tax roles, making it subject to property tax as escaped 
property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-309 (West 2009). On 
March 28, 2003, the Commission issued an Order Denying 
Reconsideration. (R. 1283.) Summit Water timely appealed 
these decisions to the District Court. 
The matter ultimately came before Judge Morris, a Tax 
Judge in the Second Judicial District, who issued his Ruling 
Granting Petitioner's Appeal in Part and Denying 
Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment on August 31, 2009, 
and his Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on 
October 6, 2009. (See Addenda C and D.) These orders 
reversed the Commission's conclusion that Summit Water's 
property did not qualify for the irrigation exemption in 
art. XIII, section 3(1) (i) (West 2009) of the Utah 
Constitution. Instead, the District Court held that the 
irrigation exemption was not limited to agricultural use, 
but also applied to non-agricultural purposes, such as the 
watering of "lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubs, trees 
and vegetation indigenous to a particular property." (See 
Addendum C, pp. 28-29; Addendum D, « 28-29.) 
The Commission and Summit County have jointly appealed 
4 
on this issue, which is the only subject of this brief. The 
District Court's decision also sustained the Commission's 
conclusion that double taxation has not occurred. Summit 
Water filed a cross-appeal on the double taxation issue, and 
it will be addressed in subsequent briefing. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summit Water Company is a private water company that 
provides culinary grade water to its members, consisting of 
homeowners and businesses in Summit County, Utah. (R. 763, 
I 31.)3 No secondary water system exists to provide non-
culinary water to members. (R. 763.) 
Summit Water estimates that 49% of the culinary water 
delivered to its members is used for indoor domestic 
purposes. (R. 763.) Summit Water estimates that the 
balance of the culinary water, 51%, is used by members for 
outside non-agricultural purposes such as "watering lawns, 
bushes, trees, ornamental plants and trees/' (R. 243, 763.) 
Summit Water makes this estimate of outside use by comparing 
winter usage with summer usage. (R. 243-250, 875-882.) 
Personal property auditors of the Commission reviewed 
3
 The citations to the record are made to the 
handwritten numbering, which reflect the record of the Utah 
Supreme Court. 
5 
the annual property tax affidavit submitted by Summit Water 
for 2000. The auditors determined that Summit Water had 
left out almost all of its taxable property from the 
affidavit. (R. 146-160.) The Commission has not allowed an 
exemption for property used to water land for non-
agricultural purposes. (R. 338, testimony of Herb Jenkins, 
personal property tax auditor; Commission Standards of 
Practice, "Exemptions," § 2.8.2) As a result of this audit, 
Summit County issued an assessment for the lien date January 
1, 2000, and escaped property assessments for the lien dates 
January 1, 1996 through 1999, for the unreported property. 
(R. 224-229.) 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Utah Constitution, since its inception, has 
exempted certain property from property tax if it is used to 
"irrigate land." Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i) (West 
2009). The Tax Commission has limited this exemption and 
the term "irrigate land" to agricultural purposes. This is 
consistent with the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371, 374 (Utah 
1970). It is also consistent with the ordinary and popular 
meaning of irrigation existing when the Constitution was 
6 
enacted in 1896. 
Despite the legal requirement that property tax 
exemptions be strictly interpreted, the District Court 
expanded in error the irrigation exemption to include 
watering for non-agricultural uses such as lawns, ornamental 
plants, shrubs or trees. The implication of this error is 
significant because the District Court's expansive ruling 
may now apply to a significant class of property never 
before exempt, such as individual sprinkler systems of 
homeowners, golf courses and other similar taxpayers.4 
ARGUMENT 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED BY BROADLY CONSTRUING THE TERM 
"TO IRRIGATE LAND," AS USED IN THE PROPERTY TAX 
EXEMPTION IN ARTICLE XIII, SECTION 3(1)(i) OF THE UTAH 
CONSTITUTION, TO INCLUDE WATERING FOR NON-AGRICULTURAL 
PURPOSES. 
Since its enactment in 1896, the Utah Constitution has 
exempted from property tax property used to irrigate land. 
The original constitutional provision in 1896 read as 
follows: 
Ditches, canals, and flumes owned and used by 
4
 The Commission and Summit County only raise the 
possible scope of the District Court's erroneous decision, 
but do not concede that such property will receive the 
exemption even under the District Court's erroneous 
interpretation. 
7 
individuals or corporations for irrigating lands 
owned by such individuals or corporations, or the 
individual members thereof, shall not be separately 
taxed so long as they shall be owned, and used 
exclusively for such purpose. 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3 (1896). 
This exemption has since been amended to include 
"pipes, reservoirs, water rights, pumping plants, power 
plants and transmission lines." See S.J.R. 2, 1930 Leg., 
Reg. Sess. (Utah). It has also been amended to replace the 
exclusive use requirement with a "to the extent used" 
limitation. See S.J.R. 3, 1982 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Utah). 
However, the requirement that the property be used for 
"irrigating land" or in its present form, "to irrigate 
land," has not changed in substance. 
The current exemption reads: 
(1) (i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping 
plants, ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power 
plants and transmission lines to the extent owned 
and used by an individual or corporation to 
irrigate land that is: (i) within the State; and 
(ii) owned by the individual or corporation, or by 
an individual member of the corporation. 
Utah Const, art. XIII, § 3(1)(i)(West 2009). This exemption 
is also codified in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1111 (West 2009), 
which is not materially different. 
Long-established practice has limited the application 
8 
of this exemption to property used to water land for 
agricultural purposes. See Commission's Standards of 
Practice, "Exemptions," § 8.2.2 (stating that "Property 
owned or used by either private or non-profit culinary water 
companies is not specifically exempted by the constitution 
and is therefore taxable.") The Commission has not extended 
it to watering for non-agricultural purposes, such as lawns 
or ornamental shrubbery. This is consistent with the Utah 
Supreme Court's decision in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 
466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970)(limiting the term "irrigation" to 
agricultural use for purposes of the property tax 
exemption), the meaning of the term "to irrigate land" 
existing when the Utah Constitution was adopted, and common 
definitions. The District Court erred by broadly 
interpreting this exemption to find that the term "to 
irrigate land" should include watering for "non-agricultural 
purposes, including the watering of lawns, grass, flowers, 
ornamental shrubbery, trees and vegetation indigenous to a 
particular property." (Addendum D, f 29.) 
A. The Utah Supreme Court has Previously Limited 
the Property Tax Exemption to Agricultural 
Uses. 
The term "irrigating lands," predecessor to the current 
9 
term "to irrigate land," has been previously defined by the 
Court. In Holliday Water, a private water company appealed 
the trial court's holding that the term "irrigating lands" 
in the constitutional irrigation exemption should be limited 
"to the agricultural sense." 466 P.2d at 372. The Court 
noted the following regarding that conclusion of the trial 
court: 
Plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred by 
restricting the meaning of the words "irrigating 
lands" to the agricultural sense and that a proper 
interpretation would include the artificial 
diversion of water for any useful purpose. 
Id. (emphasis added). The trial court in Holliday Water had 
reasoned that "the Constitutional provision . . . was 
strictly limited to property used exclusively for irrigating 
lands and that the term ^irrigation' cannot be construed in 
the broad sense advocated by plaintiff." id. The trial 
court defined "irrigation" for purposes of the property tax 
exemption as the "artificial watering of agricultural land" 
and the "application of water to land for the production of 
crops. . . . " id. 372-373 (citations omitted). 
The trial court in Holliday Water defined irrigation 
for purposes of the irrigation exemption by referencing a 
definition of "irrigation" in 30 Am.Jur. Irrigation, § 2 
10 
(1958), which reads: 
Irrigation is defined as the artificial watering of 
agricultural land in regions where the rainfall is 
insufficient for crops. The ordinary and popular 
conception denotes the application of water to land 
for the production of crops, the term embraces all 
artificial watering of lands, whether by channels, 
by flooding, or merely by sprinkling. 
Id. at 372 (emphasis added). 
The Holliday Water Court agreed with the trial court's 
conclusion and stated: 
The trial court properly concluded that one could 
not in good conscience concede that the terms "for 
irrigating lands" and "used exclusively for such 
purposes as" used in the Constitution could be 
construed beyond the aforementioned definitions. 
Id. at 373. 
The "used exclusively for" requirement has subsequently 
been replaced with a "to the extent" used limitation, but 
the Court's holding as it relates to the term "for 
irrigating lands" remains unchanged. See id. at 373. The 
Court in Holliday Water justified this strict interpretation 
by noting that the Constitution requires that all tangible 
property is taxable unless specifically exempt. Id. 
Despite the Court's conclusion in Holliday Water that 
the ordinary and popular understanding of the term 
"irrigation" in the property tax exemption relates to 
11 
agricultural purposes, the District Court held that it 
should apply to watering of land for non-agricultural 
purposes. The District Court made this error by confusing 
the mode of irrigation (pipes, canals, ditches, sprinklers) 
with the purpose of irrigation which was commonly understood 
to be for agricultural purposes at the time of the adoption 
of the constitutional exemption. 
Specially, while the cited definition of irrigation 
relied upon by the trial court and accepted by this Court 
links irrigation with agricultural purposes, the definition 
also recognized that the watering for agricultural purposes 
can be accomplished in many ways, such as through 
"channels," "flooding" or "sprinkling." Summit Water and 
the District Court misapplied the phrase in the cited 
definition, "embraces all artificial watering of lands," as 
expanding the ordinary and popular definition of irrigation 
beyond agricultural purposes. In fact, as the cited 
definition illustrates, the phrase "embraces all artificial 
watering of lands" merely establishes that irrigation can 
occur through a variety of means, such as "channels," 
"flooding" or "sprinklers." It does not change the ordinary 
and popular understanding that irrigation pertains to 
12 
agricultural purposes.5 
The use of the generic term "irrigation" outside the 
context of the irrigation exemption may have a broader 
application depending upon the context. Use of the term in 
other contexts does not dictate the meaning of the term in 
the property tax exemption context. For example, the 
District Court erroneously cited to Mt. Olivet Cemetery 
Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876 (Utah 1925), for support 
of its conclusion that the term irrigation denotes the 
outside watering for non-agricultural purposes. Mt. Olivet 
involved the determination of the "use" of water to 
establish priority in a water claim. The Court simply held 
that the "use" of water toy the cemetery for "grass, flowers, 
ornamental shrubbery and trees" qualifies as a sufficient 
use for purposes of claiming a right to water. .Id. at 880. 
While not germane to any relevant statutory term at issue in 
Mt. Olivet, the Court did use the word "irrigation" to 
5
 The confusion over the correct meaning likely occurs 
when one looks at only parts of the cited definition in 
Holliday Water. In order to understand this Court's 
discussion in Holliday Water, one must look at the complete 
definition that this Court and the trial court in Holliday 
Water were relying on. 
13 
describe the diversion of the water for such purposes.6 
Such passing use by the Court where the meaning of the word 
was not an issue in the case and had no relevance to the 
outcome hardly constitutes a definition of the term. It 
certainly has no connection to the use of the term in the 
property tax exemption at issue. Obviously, the drafters of 
the Constitution did not intend a broad application of the 
exemption or they would not have limited its application 
with the "used exclusively'' language in the original 
Constitution or the "to the extent" used language found in 
the current version. Such phrases require limitation. 
The ordinary and popular understanding that the 
property tax exemption relates to agricultural purposes was 
also recognized by the Court when addressing a related 
property tax exemption, the exemption of power used to pump 
water for irrigation. Washington County v. State Tax 
Comm'n, 133 P.2d 564 (Utah 1943). The Court stated the 
irrigation property tax exemption was "probably adopted 
. . . to encourage the cultivation and irrigation of arid 
lands." IdL at 566. The term "cultivation" is commonly 
6The Court in Mt. Olivet could have used the words 
"diversion" or "watering" in place of "irrigation" without 
any consequence to its holding. 
14 
associated with planting for growing crops. The Oxford 
English Dictionary (2d ed. online version 1989), defines 
"cultivate" as "to bestow [labor] and attention upon (land) 
[for the] . . . the raising of crops. . . ."7 
B. At the Time of the Enactment of the 
Constitution, Irrigation Pertained to 
Agriculture. 
Constitutional terms should be interpreted consistently 
with the common understanding prevalent when the provision 
was enacted. See American Bush v. City of South Salt Lake, 
2006 UT 40, 1 12, 140 P.3d 1235 (Utah) (holding that where a 
term may have two plausible meanings, the Court can consider 
the Constitution's "text, historical evidence . . . when it 
was drafted and Utah's particular traditions at the time of 
drafting.") 
Here, the District Court has dramatically broadened the 
application of this exemption to non-agricultural purposes. 
The conseguences of this broad interpretation go beyond any 
exemption contemplated by the drafters of the Utah 
Constitution in 1896. 
7
 Consistent with agriculture use, Black's Law 
Dictionary defines "crops" as "[p]roducts that are grown, 
raised, and harvested." Black's Law Dictionary, 303 (7th 
ed. 1999) . 
15 
In 1896, the term irrigation was commonly associated 
with agricultural purposes. See Beoker v. Marble Creek Irr. 
Co., 49 P. 892, 894 (Utah 1897)(discussing irrigation in the 
context of small farms and land for grazing); Patterson v. 
Ryan, 108 P. 1118, 1119 (Utah 1910) (correlating irrigation 
with "producing crops'') ; and Promontory Ranch v. Argile, 79 
P. 47, 49 (Utah 1904) (addressing irrigation for the 
"raising of potatoes, cabbage, and lucerne."). 
The 1899 Universal Dictionary of the English Language, 
Vol. 3, p. 2741, stated that the "Ord[inary] Lang[uage]" of 
the term "irrigation" is in an "[a]gric[ultural]" setting 
consisting of the "[t]he act of watering land . . . ." (See 
Addendum E, Dictionary excerpts.) Similarly, the 1895 An 
American Dictionary of the English Language, Webster, 626 
(1895), dictionary defines irrigation as: "[i]n agriculture, 
the operation of causing water to flow over lands for 
nourishing plants." (See Addendum E.) 
The Court has noted that the State of Utah has depended 
upon irrigation to produce crops since its inception. 
Loveland v. Orem City Corp., 746 P.2d 763, 772 (Utah 1987). 
In that regard, the Court stated "that agriculture in this 
state has from the beginning depended to a great extent upon 
16 
irrigatioi i• __ "T1 1 e Coi ir t f i 1 r 11 1 er coi 1 c 1 uded " [ t ] J: 11 is 1 1 1 e 
utility of irrigation canals, not only to the 
owner/possessor of such canals , but to the public as a 
whole, is of great significance." Ld , a t 7' 7 2 - 73 T he re : s 
no suggestion that the drafters of the Constitution intended 
the irrigation exempt:i oi I to appJ y beyoi id 11 Ie agri cu 11ure 
context which played such an important role at the time the 
Const i 11 11 :i o i I \ / a s e i I a c t e d .8 
C. -.Property Tax Exemptions Must be Strict"" 
Construed 
Property tax exempti oi Is i t: n ist •. <.. s: n e t ,y construed/' 
Corporation of the Episcopal Church v. Utah State Tax 
Comm'i u 91 9 E • 2d 556, 558 (I Jtal I 1 M '-itations omitted). 
"The burden of establishing the exempt: 
entity claim-iiiy i* . . ." Xd. (citations omitlod). A 
person who claims an ex^nr : . :• :i --ji.- • :: \ : 
unequivocal!:* ^ho- he fall:; wiitin the exemption [and] any 
doubt 11111s" - rvf i ^iio: Research 
Institute v. Tax Commission, 598 P.2d 1348, 1350-51 (Utah 
See Elwood Mead, Irrigation Institutions, 220 
(1910)(noting that Utah's beginning differed from other arid 
states because its principal industry was agriculture); 
Charles Hillman Brough, Irrigation in Utah, 198 (1898), 
(stating that x" [i] rrigation promotes better methods of 
agriculture."), (Addendum F ) . 
17 
1979). "[A]n exemption will not be aided by judicial 
interpretation. It must be shown to exist by express terms 
in the enactment which it is claimed grants it." Friendship 
Manor Corp. v. Tax Comm'n, 487 P.2d 1272, 1277 (Utah 
1971)(quoting, Parker v. Quinn, 64 P. 961 (Utah 1901)). 
The justification for strict interpretation is to 
equalize the burden of government. Id. at 1277. "A liberal 
construction of exemption provisions results in the loss of 
. . . municipal revenue and places a greater burden on 
nonexempt taxpayers." Utah County Bd. Of Equalization v. 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 709 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 
1985) (citing Real Estate Tax Exemption for Federally 
Subsidized Housing Corporations, 64 Minn.L.Rev. 1094, 1096-
97 (1980)) . 
By erroneously defining the term "to irrigate land," 
for non-agricultural purposes such as the watering of lawns, 
shrubs and ornamental plants, the District Court may have 
unwittingly expanded the exemption to a substantial class of 
property that has historically been subject to tax. For 
example, the District Court's definition may apply to 
sprinkler systems of individuals, private golf courses, and 
businesses. There was no argument presented to the District 
18 
Court that the drafters of 11 1 e i rr,.i gat:i or 1 property tax 
exemption '. 1896 intended it t_o be broadly construed 
• J '
 : .- : IROV^T, wh i ic iiic exemption has been amended 
a various times in uhe last hunc'ed y^an;, i,«> -it tempt Im,, 
been made to expand the exemption beyond the strict 
interpretation that 1 .- * ...-.> • ;•; . <>,. . ^
 Lf:c commission and 
the Court. The Utah Legislature has had the opportunity to 
proposo ronsl ilnl iuiul atnandm.en.ts to alter the Commission'' s 
practice, but has not. 
Kurllua, I ti»' Commission is unaware of any legislative 
history that would suggest the term,,, "i r ; lands" should 
have any broader meaning than, that commonly known at the 
time of the establishment of ti le exempt] or 1 '•' a tins 
reason, the Commission has considered the term "irrigate 
lands i •• .:JM: uses. 
"i'l'ic» Meaning of Agricultural Use 
Issue II"' i 
The i"ouii d*>'w. ,IMi ,..M-U . H u m e the term 
"agricultural use" in I hi s {»^^ _a order to reverse the 
D i r n i , • Has acknowledged that the 
watering ui lawns, shrubs or pidnts d.-o- - - . 
' ;: . .nil n<=e. (P 1 ^ 1 I r>94 v h(> District Court also 
concluded that \ - . .UILS was a 
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non-agricultural use and this conclusion was not appealed. 
(Addendum D, f 29). Summit Water's exemption must be denied 
if the Court finds that the term "irrigate land" in the 
irrigation exemption is limited to agricultural use.9 
CONCLUSION 
The District Court erred in granting the irrigation 
exemption to a portion of Summit Water's property. The 
District Court should be reversed. 
DATED this 3 j V day of May, 2010. 
TIMOTHYS. BODILY 
Assistant Attorney General 
Utah Attorney General's Office 
DAVlirX. THOMAS 
Summit County Attorney's Office 
9Although not at issue here, the Commission is often 
required to determine agricultural use in the tax context. 
eg. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-503 and 59-12-18 (West 2009). 
Typically, the determination of agricultural use focuses on 
farming activities that are conducted for commercial gain. 
In property tax, agricultural use must be determined in 
order for property to qualify for preferential valuation 
under the Farmland Assessment Act. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
503 (West 2009). The tests for agricultural use applied in 
the Farmland Assessment Act focus on the production of crops 
and the income of the landowner derived from farming 
activities. Ld. Irrigating land that qualifies under the 
Farmland Assessment Act may be one means to determine 
agricultural use. 
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ADDENDUM A 
nivFORFTHI' UTAH STATI'TAX COMMISSION 
SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION, 
) ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL 
Petitioner, ' SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
v. , Appeal No. 01-0725 
) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, ) 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE ) 
OF UTAH, ) Tax Type: Personal Property 
} 
Respondent. . PVan 
) 
Presiding: 
"R. Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
ci DePaulis, Commissioner 
p]
-an, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: John S, Flitton, Esq. 
Shawn T Welch, Esq. 
p o r Respondent: David L. Thomas, Chief Civil Deputy Summit 
County Attorney 
STATEMENJ ui i i l h i A S E 
On September 7, 2001, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgment in this 
matter on the grounds .. .'here-were no disputed issues of n laterial fact and I I espoi ident was ei ititled 
t 0 relief as a matter of law. A Hearing on Respondent's Motion for Summary Judgment was held 
on December 19., 2001. 
This i i lattei oi igiiiall;; can le befc i e the Gcii nmission • ith I 'etitioner's appeal of 
personal property tax, assessed by Respondent for the years 1996 through 2000. The matter 
Appeal No. 01-0725 
proceeded to an Initial Hearing before the State Tax Commission and an Order from the Initial 
Hearing was issued on August 14, 2001. Following the issuance of the Order, Petitioner filed a 
written request for a Formal Hearing. After the matter had been scheduled for a Formal Hearing, 
Respondent filed its Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ANALYSIS 
There were three issues which the parties addressed in their briefs on the Motion to 
Dismiss and with the oral arguments presented at the Hearing on Motion: 1) whether Petitioner 
qualifies for the irrigation exemption at Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5, 
and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111 on a portion of its personal property; 2) whether Petitioner was 
required to file an application for the irrigation exemption in order to claim the exemption for each 
year at issue; and 3) whether the assessment would result in improper double taxation. 
The first issue, whether Petitioner qualifies for the irrigation exemption at 
Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5 and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111, 
presents a question of law to the Commission with no material issues of disputed fact. The relevant 
material facts pertaining to this issue are uncomplicated. Petitioner is a Utah non-profit mutual 
water company which provides culinary water to its shareholders. Its shareholders are residential 
and commercial property owners and the water is used on the shareholders1 properties. All water 
provided by Petitioner is culinary grade water. However, shareholders use the water both for indoor 
culinary purposes and for outdoor uses which consist mainly of the watering of lawns and 
- 2 -
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purposes and the amount of water used for outdoor purposes. 
Petitioi lei alleges that it is ei ititled to the ii rigation exemption on, a portion of its 
personal property tax equal to the portion of water used for outdoor purposes. Respondent ar^nrs 
that Petitioner is not entitled to the irrigation exemption as a matter of law as the exemption applies 
ti1 flu in ij'atr HI ul\i|Ji i" ullui JI ", mi",, iiH u\i idcnli.il and en nun icial Li", ni, ,ind l.uidseaptn^ 1 H'ah 
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1111 provides as follows: 
Water lights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power
 t ,„;.ts, pumping 
plants, transmission lines, pipes, and fhu^ 4~ • } s c ^ by 
individuals or corporations for irrigating L i 
by those individuals or corporations, or the indiA iV.;:il members of the 
corporation, are exempted from taxation to the twtcnt t!\"it 'h**v are 
owned and used for irrigation purposes 
Petitioner argues for a broad definition of the "irrigation of land" which includes 
watering lawns, ornamental flowers and sin ubs and other vegetation planted in the yards of 
residences and businesses. Petitioner relies on the 1925 Utah Supr -r.v • . >n of Mt. Olivet 
Cemetery Ass'n v. Salt Lake City, 235 P.876. In that case the Utah Supreme Court indicated that the 
lawi i and on namental si n i i1 ^ "llp1 v • 11 " * olai its of a cei i letei j w ei e " ::i ops " 1 1 le Coi i imission doe s i lot 
find this case to be appliuibk: because it involved a water dispute and not the definition of 
"irrigation " f or the purposes of L;*„. . wdc Ann. o^.. I •• -
'At: • be: Hearing on Motion, Petitioner's attorney stated that 
some small portion of water supplied by Petitioner may have been 
used for agricultural crops. However, this was a mere 
allegation, unsupported by affidavit or other evidence in the 
Summary Judgment proceeding. 
-3-
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In determining what is "irrigation" for the purposes of the irrigation exemption set 
out in the Constitution of Utah, Article XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5, and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-
1111, the Commission notes that exemptions are strictly construed. In Parsons Asphalt Products. 
Inc. v. Utah State Tax Comm'n. 617 P.2d 397, 398 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court stated, 
"Even though taxing statues should generally be construed favorable to the taxpayer and strictly 
against the taxing authority, the reverse is true of exemptions. Statutes which provide for 
exemptions should be strictly construed, and one who so claims has the burden of showing his 
entitlement to the exemption." 
Upon review it is the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's definition of 
"irrigation" is inconsistent with the definition articulated by the Utah Supreme Court in Holliday 
Water Company v. Lambourne. 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970). This case involved directly the issue of 
whether or not a water company qualified for the irrigation exemption at Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-
1111. Despite the constitutional and statutory revision subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision 
in Holliday which eliminated the requirement that the water be used "exclusively" for irrigation 
purposes, Holliday is still the controlling case law on the definition of "irrigation" for the purposes 
of the exemption. It is the Commission's position that the irrigation exemption applies strictly to 
irrigation for agricultural uses. Watering of residential and commercial lawns and landscaping does 
not constitute agricultural use. Petitioner does not qualify for the irrigation exemption and 
Respondent is entitled to summary judgment on this issue as a matter of law. 
Having decided the first issue, finding that Petitioner is not entitled to the irrigation 
exemption, the Commission concludes that the second issue, whether Petitioner was required to file 
- 4 -
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an application foi the irrigation exemption .xuu: i^ae there were 
questions of fact concerning whether Respondent had waived the requirement to file an applnTITI'MI 
and esi * • • ter w a s not u - ^ ; •*• agr icul tura l i r r i g a t i o n , P e t i t i o n e r 
would not have qualified for the exemption, even if Petition' 
* I urning to the third issue, whether the assessment would result in Improper double 
taxation, Petitioner argues that much o:' M. > » > • •»
 : ovements appurtenant to the real 
property'which have lost their separate identity for taxation purposes. Pet i t ions y »t 
Petitioner's r :J?- 1 S • -*^i *a,u .^ ui .heir real property, which is hivux-
due to the availability of water provided by the subject property. Prtilioiii 1 HI i rnrs fliiil I'bei v ,iie 
n •»',p,i' 1:. -. iWiiioiki JH mts to the Affidavit of Barbara Kresser, Summit 
County Assessor, and the Affidavit of Paul i1 ->• . : .. **. .'.^  two 
affidavits present opposing facts on this issue. Ms. Kresser states in her affidavit that nc.- r 
Petitioner's shareholders " ' "";iln 'voiks included in any tax valuations on either 
real or personal property owned by the shareholder." In his affidavit, Mi l'ln nmhvn milic/Hlni lLi( 
pt'ru 1 il'v ip • ' - .. in^i^i market value than a similar property without wafer 
Petitioner also points n< \\w .nj.M ""T' , r o r i Kx" v: r ndnil ii11 u hi lj ]h * | nn inn unhealed ihai UK 
1 HI
 iPj iiit vaiueof the subject property was "fixtures." 
After rev 1 * • ;..cr L \ idence presented in the hearing the 
Commission concludes ih,it there are issues of material fact as well as lq;;il < uiLSklniifioiis .villi the 
• le taxation The Commission finds, therefore, that summary judgment is 
inappropriate on this issue. 
- 5 -
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APPLICABLE LAW 
A summary judgment shall be rendered by the Tax Commission, "if the pleadings, 
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving parity is entitled to 
a judgment as a matter of law." Utah R. Civ.P. 56; Utah Code Ann. Sec. 63-46b-l(4). 
ORDER 
Based on the forgoing, partial summary judgment is granted in favor of Respondent 
on the first issue discussed in this appeal, namely the Commission finds that Petitioner does not, as 
a matter of law, qualify for the irrigation exemption provided in the Constitution of Utah, Article 
XIII, Section 2, Paragraph 5, and Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-1 111. Based on its finding on the first 
issue, the Commission finds the second issue, the issue of whether or not an application shdiild have 
been filed, is mute. The Commission determines that summary judgment is not appropriate on the 
third issue which concerns double taxation, as there are issues as to material facts. The matter will 
proceed to the Formal Hearing as scheduled on this third issue. 
DATED this /S~ day oK-JJJ!^ 2002. 
ane Phan J  
Administrative Law Judge 
- 6 -
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HY OTJDIT OF Til l ' f(/MMISSION 
The undersigned have m i r v u l , |"1 motion and concur in this decision. 
DATED this / j T day of 7 ^ A t ^ C ^ ^ f • • 
P 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
Palmer DePaulis 
Commissioner 
/? << > 6 W x % - B nice J ohnsc 
4/,^e* \ Lommissioner *  
f " I SEAL 
V4#0F\f 
Notice oi • - -.'tMUM you have twenty (20) days after the date of this order to file-a Request for 
Reconsiderswv,a< »c Commission pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §63-46b-13. A Request for Reconsideration 
must allege newly discovered evidence or a mistake of law or fact. If you do not file a Request for 
Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty (30) days after 
the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§59-1-601 and 
63-46b-13 et seq. 
JKP/01-0725.s]d 
ADDENDUM B 
MAY - 9 2003 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION, 
Petitioner. 
BOARD OF EQUALIZATION, 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF 
UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Presiding: 
Bruce Johnson, Commissioner 
Jane Phan, Administrative Law Judge 
Appearances: 
For Petitioner: 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
AND FINAL DECISION 
Appeal No. 01-0725 
Tax Type: Persona] Property 
Judge: Phan 
John Davis, Attorney at Law 
John S. Flitton. Attorney at Law 
For Respondent: David L. Thomas. Chief Civil Deputy Summit 
County Attorney 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This mane: came before the Utah State Tax Commission for a Formal Hearing on September 
25, 2002. Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the hearing, the Tax Commission hereby 
makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Petitioner is appealing a personal property assessment for the years 1996 through 
2000. The assessment resulted from an audit on the subject property for the tax year 2000 and an escaped 
property tax audit assessment for the years 1999 ihrough 1996. The audits were performed by a Tax 
Commission auditor. Petitioner appealed the assessment to Respondent, arguing that much of the subject 
persona] property was exempt from taxation. Respondent denied the appeal and Petitioner filed an appeal with 
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the State Tax Commission. 
2. The assessed value resulting from the audit for the subject property for the 2000 tax 
year is $5,178,589 and the tax amount is S57.114. For 1999 Petitioner had claimed only S22,550 in taxable 
personal property on its personal property affidavit. The audit determined S3.601.242 in taxable personal 
property, for a total of $57,114 in personal property tax. For 1998 Petitioner had claimed $29,450 in taxable 
personal property on its affidavit. The audit determined $4,034,934 in taxable personal property for a total 
of $39,679 in personal property tax. For 1997 Petitioner had claimed $34,080 in taxable personal property 
on its affidavit. The audit determined $3,285,335 in taxable personal property for $33,159 in personal property 
tax. For 1996 Petitioner claimed $40,480 in taxable personal property on its affidavit. The audit determination 
was $3,541,413 in taxable personal property for a personal property lax of $37,957. 
3. An Initial Hearing was held in this matter and an Initial Hearing Order was issued on 
August 14,2001. denying Petitioner's appeal. Subsequently, Petitioner requested a Formal Hearing. Prior to 
the Formal Hearing, Respondent filed a Motion for Summary Judgement. After a hearing on the motion, the 
Commission issued the Order Granting Partial Summary Judgment on February 15, 2002, which granted 
partial summary judgment in favor of Respondent on two of the three issues. Th^^tfes~res€!verity the 
StinOT^rylfaagmeflt^r^^ Commission found thai Petitioner did no^^^maaer^fJaw^aai t i^ 
forthelmga^on^x^mptioB^royided in the Constitution of Utah, Afrieie XUL Section 2, P-ara^aph J>9 jand . 
IStaTi^Co^e'A^rS'Sc^S^^-^ll 1. Based on this finding the Commission concluded that a second summary 
judgment issue, whether or not an application should have been filed, was moot. The Commission determined 
that there were material facts at issue, so that summary judgment was not appropriate for the Ahird issue of 
'4©iib1e t^axafiot!. This matter proceeded to the Formal Hearing on the third issue. 
4. The personal property at issue in this appeal consists of water pipelines and substation 
facilities including pumping stations, underground storage facilities and well houses ("Water Distribution 
- 2 -
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Facilities"). Approximately two-thirds of the pipelines at issue are buried in public utility easements alongside 
public roadways. Much of the remaining one-third of the pipelines are locaied in private right of ways. The 
pipelines occasionally cross under public roadways but only a small fraction of the pipelines are actually under 
the roadways. 
5. Summit Water Distribution Company ("Summit Water") is a Utah non-profit mutual 
water company. The corporation has four classes of stock: 1) Class A Development Stock: 2) Class B Use 
Stock; 3) Class C Irrigation Stock; and 4) Class D Snowmaking Stock. Once Class A holders have met 
specified requirements in building and developing water service infra structures so that water can flow from 
Summit Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A Shareholder's new development. Class A shares can be 
converted to Class B shares. One of the requirements is generally that title to the new water service infra-
structure is transferred to Summit Water. Summit Water then provides water to its Class B shareholders who 
are residential and commercial water users. Once the share of water is attached to ~a particular parcel *rf* 
propeily it%ecomes^^ul*ena?it4li€ret^ and die water right can not be sold or iransfered separate from the 
prqpeity* At the present time there are more Class A shareholders than Class B shareholders and theoretically 
Class A shareholders could outvote Class B shareholders. 
6. Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, there is no 
municipal water source available. Without water these properties could not be developed for either residential 
or commercial purposes. Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and a water 
supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair market value than real property that has 
no water, with all other property characteristics being equal. The -availability of wateriKralot increases the 
value "by 50% or Wore tSver <a simtiar lot without water. The increase in market value is ihe result of ihe 
availability ©f-water 4©*tteMofc The value does not represent a pro rata share of ihe Water Distribution 
Facilities. There was no indication that there was a difference in value between a lot provided water by 
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Summit Water or an identical lot provided water by some other provider or a municipal water system. 
7. Property taxes are based on a tax rate, determined by the taxing jurisdictions, 
multiplied by the assessed value of the property. The assessed value is based on the market value. Within 
the same taxing jurisdictions and for the same classes of property, the higher the assessed value the more the 
property owner pays in property tax. Generally Class B shareholders pay more in real property tax for 
properties serviced by Summit Water because the property has water. 
8. Title to the Water Distribution Facilities, as well as the water rights, is held in the 
name of Summit Water. 
9. Summit Water's water sources and the Water Distribution Facilities contain some 
surplus capacity, the extent of which was in dispute. However, it was apparent that Summit Water installs its 
pipes and builds its infrastructure with future development in mind. The value of the surplus capacity is not 
related to the increased real property' values of the Class B shareholder's property which is provided water by-
Summit Water. 
10. Ms. Barbara Kiesser. Summit County Assessor, testified concerning the escaped 
property assessment. In the County there were approximately 2.800 personal property accounts and the County-
did not have the staff to audit the self assessment personal property affidavit forms every year. The self 
assessment affidavit form Petitioner filed each year was accepted and entered without review for the five year 
period. When Petitioner's affidavit was finally reviewed it came to the Summit County's attention that there 
may have been an error on Summit Water's pan and Summit County requested that the Tax Commission audit 
Petitioner's personal property tax account. The Tax Commission's personal properly auditor concluded that 
Petitioner had substantially under reported its taxable personal property. 
] 1. The audit tax assessment was consistent w jth the tax treatment of other similarly 
structured mutual water companies located in Summit County. 
- A -
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APPLICABLE LAW 
1. All tangible personal property shall be assessed and taxed at a uniform and equal rate 
on the basis of its fair market value, as valued on January L unless otherwise provided by law. (Utah Code 
Ann. Sec. 59-2-103(1).) 
2. (a) "Property" means property that is subject to assessment and taxation according 
to its value, (b) "Property" does not include intangible property as defined in this section. (Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 59-2-102 (24).) 
3. "Personal property" includes: (a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (24) 
which is the subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and 
"improvements;" (b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets or alleys; . . . (Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 59-2-102 (23).) 
4. "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements 
erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land or not. (Utah Code Ann. 
Sec. 59-2-102(16).) 
5. "Real estate or property" includes: (a) the possession of. claim to. ownership of. or 
right to the possession of land; (b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all timber belonging 
to individuals or corporations growing or beginning on the lands of this state or the Untied States, and all rights 
and privileges appertaining to these; and (c) improvements. (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (26).) 
6. "Escaped property" means any property, whether personal, land, or any improvements 
to the property, subject to taxation and is: 
(i) inadvertently omined from the tax rolls, assigned to the incorrect parcel or assessed to the 
wrong taxpayer by the assessing authority; (ii) undervalued or omitted from the tax rolls because of the failure 
of the taxpayer to comply with the reporting requirements of this chapter; or (iii) undervalued because of errors 
- c : , -
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made by the assessing authority based upon incomplete or erroneous information furnished by the taxpayer. 
(Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (11).) 
7. The commission shall provide the services of qualified personal property appraisers for 
the purpose of auditing taxable personal property accounts m each county. The results of the audit shall be 
reported to the assessor of the county. The reports shall constitute the confidential records of the commission 
and the assessor's office but the commission or the assessor may publish statistical information based upon the 
audits. The accounts to be audited shall be determined by the commission and county assessor. (Utah Code 
Ann. 59-2-705(1).) 
8. The County assessor may request a signed statement from any person setting forth all the 
real and personal property' assessable by the assessor which is owned, possessed managed or under the control 
of the person at 12 o'clock noon on January 1. This statement shall be filed within 30 days after requested by 
the assessor. (Utah Code Ann. 59-2-306(1).) 
DISCUSSION 
Petitioner presents an interesting argument in this maner. However, the Commission agrees 
with Respondent that there has been no impermissible double taxation. feutienera^gues^hatiaayiBeni^f the 
tax audiC^iiii^s^p^^}%^^assessHiei3ts€or4lie years 1996 through 2000 ^ voirfd constitute double taxation, 
in^hat^ummit^^i^ty^s^r^ad^e^ejving substantially higher real property tax for parcels of real property 
^Wiied^Stimmk4^t^Fls<3ass^^sharehoJders feecause the real property has water ^ vailable^due to the Water 
BistriburiontfaGiliti^^at^sstie Sti^liis appeal. Petitioner argues thai the Water DistrifeutioBJacilities should 
^oii^e^xca^ep^fal^^l^f^^lpropeitA'-fromlhe rea? property to which it is physicaHy and permanently 
attached^ affixed? 
Petitioner's argument does not take into account the surplus capacity of the Water Distribution 
Facilities or the portion of the value attributable to the Class A shareholders. The increased market \alue of 
- 6 -
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the real property due to the fact that it has water is based on the market's reaction to water a\ailability versus 
no water availability and has no relation to the pro rata value per shareholder of the Y\atei Distribution 
Facilities. In addition the tax treatment is consistent with all other similarly structured water companies in 
Summit County and as far as the Commission is aware, state wide. Certain]}. Petitioner presented no evidence 
to the contrary. The Commission notes that there are exemptions from propem tax foi municipal water 
systems and the value that having water available adds to the real property is not then subtracted from the real 
property tax of the real property served by the municipal system, which would be the logical extension of 
Petitioner's line of reasoning. 
The Utah Supreme Court rejected an argument similar to that made by Petitioner in this matter 
inHoiUday Water C^mpanj'Y^ Lambourne. 466 P.2d 371 (1970). In that case the Plaintiff had argued that 
the water rights of the individual shareholder enhanced the value of each shareholder's land and the land was 
then assessed and taxed at a higher value. The Plaintiff in that case went on to argue that when the county also 
taxed the facilities of the mutual water company that provided the water it constituted double taxation. Id. at 
373. The Court sustained the lower court's rejection of the double taxation argument. 
!tis^3rflier4*emioner1s position that the Water Distribution Facilities are an improvement to 
the^rsai property and therefore, not pergonal property. Petitioner argues that because the pipes are buried in 
the ground, they are "affixed" to the land and are. therefore, an "improvement." "Utah Code defines personal 
property as "even7 class of property as defined in subsection (24) which is the subject of ownership and is not 
included within the meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvement" The statute goes on to specifically 
include in its definition of personal property "gas and water mains and pipes laid m roads, streets or alleys." 
defining such pipes as personal propem. notwithstanding any attachment or affixation to the real estate. (Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 (23).) 
Petitioner points out that most of the water mains and pipes at }ss\^ are laic in the utility right-
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of-ways alongside the roadways, not in the roadways. Although Petitioner presumably would recognize that 
its pipes and mains are tangible personal property to the extent they underlie actual roads, it rejects the 
conclusion that the same pipe or main is still personal property when it does not underlie an actual road, street 
or alley. This leads to the absurd result that a pipeline's character changes from foot to foot if its path varies 
slightly from the road above it. It also leads to the conclusion that a pipeline alongside a two-lane road is real 
property, but becomes personal property if the road is widened. 
Our duty, of course, is to construe the statute as wrinen. In matters of legal interpretation we 
expect and receive no deference from the courts. But in administering the tax laws of the state, as we are 
required to do by the Utah Constitution, we should artempt to avoid absurd results. A^jpeline ihat isinja 
p u W i c ^ i ^ t ^ ^ ^ i ^ ^ i ^ ^ S S ^ ^ ^ ^ o e s ^ o t -improve" 4heproperty any more than a similar pipeline laid 
^4?lgriiiy^ and mains^n question wers laid in such .-right-of-ways, 
aloiigside^andlsW^ffill^tt^^MSsrstrcets and alleys.. We believe the,pipelines ihus^uaJify for die statutory 
It appears that some of the pipelines crossed private property pursuant to easements, and were 
not in roadways at all. In those cases, also, the pipelines did not benefit the property in which they were laid. 
They were not "improvements" to the land, they were burdens. Although the existence of water benefited the 
lot, there was no evidence that a lot with a main pipeline under it was no more valuable than an adjoining lot, 
unburdened by the large pipeline. And, although there was no evidence on this point, a contrary result is likely 
because of the limited development potential of a lot burdened with a large utility easement. 
We hold that the pipelines and mains in question, owned by the Petitioner but laid in utility-
easements under and alongside roads, streets and alleys, and under certain parcels of private propeny. are 
personal property. Because they were not reported to the assessor on the personal property renditions, they 
constitute escaped property under Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102(11). 
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The classification of these pipelines may be more important procedurally than substantively. 
Under the Utah Constitution, all property, whether real or personal, is subject to tax at its fair market value, 
unless specifically exempted. Respondent has testified that the value of the pipes and mains was not included 
in any real property assessments and. for the reasons set forth above, we find that to be the case. Thus, even 
if the pipes and mains should have been assessed as real property, they would qualify as escaped property 
during the years in issue as property "inadvertently omitted form the tax rolls" within the meaning of Sec. 59-2-
102(11). 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Water Distribution Facilities at issue in this matter are not "improvements" included 
in the definition of "real estate" they are instead taxable personal property. (Utah Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102 
(26)&(23).) 
2. There is no improper double taxation in this instance where the value of the real property 
is higher due to the fact that it has water from the Water Distribution Facilities at issue and where the County 
has also assessed a personal property tax on the Water Distribution Facilities. 
3. The Water Distribution Facilities at issue in this appeal were not fully reported to the 
Assessor on the personal property affidavits of Petitioner and they constitute escaped property under Utah 
Code Ann. Sec. 59-2-102(11). 
- Q -
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DECISION AND ORDER 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission denies Petitioner's appeal in this matter, and 
sustains the audit and escaped property tax assessments for the tax years 1996 through 2000. It is so ordered. 
DATED this fifj day of / j ^ f ^ 2003 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TA* COMMISSION: 
The Commission has reviewed this case and the undersigned concur in this decision. 
Pam Hendrickson 
Commission Chair 
&M^-(L&JL, 
DATED this
 t M day of ,'0,1%/Yl. • 2003. 
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Request for Reconsideration with the Commission, this order constitutes final agency action. You have thirty 
(30) days after the date of this order to pursue judicial review of this order in accordance with Utah Code Arm. 
§§59-1-601 and 63-46b-13 et. seq. 
MP/0'-0725 fof 
1 0 -
i itth Suae Tax Commission 
VS'IC' Appeal 
Certificate of Mailing 
Jummit Water Distribution vs Summit Counrv BOE 0J-072S 
Barbara J. Kresser 
Summit County Assessor 
P.O.Box 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Respondent 
Blake Frazier 
Summit County Auditor 
P O B o x 128 
Coalville. UT 84017 
Respondent 
David Thomas 
POBox 128 
Coalville, UT 84017 
Summit Water Distribution 
jchh S Flinon 
] 850 Beneficial Life Tower 
-.Salt Lake City. UT 84] ] ] 
Attorney for Afiecwd Counry(s) 
Anornev for Petitioner 
**** CERTIFICATION**** 
i hereby certify thai J mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named panies. 
Q/M'HM i / . / / . •'/?/<< y//?/?*.-: 
Date Sienaiure 
3:00 pm 
Certificate of Mailing 
Summit Water Distribution vs Summit County BOE 01-0725 
Summit Water Distribution Petitioner 
6400 N Pace Frontage Road 
Park City, UT 84098 
****CERTJFJCA TJON**** 
] hereby certify thai 1 mailed a copy of the foregoing document addressed to each of the above named panics. 
Dale ' Signature 
1/28/03 3:00 pm 
ADDENDUM C 
D ii^ifeiiwfe /r~ 
n W p - 8 7ffl -7 
W 
* f . 1 
yy L— 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT C C f t l W t ^ ^ 
FARMINGTON DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
SUMMIT WATER DISTRIBUTION 
COMPANY, 
Petitioner and Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION, 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF 
SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent and Appellee. 
RULING GRANTING PETITIONER'S 
APPEAL IN PART AND DENYING 
RESPONDENT'S MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 030923183 
Agency Decision No. 01-0725 
Judge John R. Morris 
Summit Water Distribution Co. ("Summit Water") appeals the decision of the 
Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") upholding Summit County's 
assessment of personal property tax against Summit Water's water distribution 
facilities on three grounds: first, that the water distribution facilities are not "taxable 
personal property" under the pertinent statutes; second, that the taxation of the 
water distribution facilities as personal property would be unconstitutional double 
taxation, since the value of the facilities is taxed as a result of the value added to the 
real property benefitting from the water delivered; and, third, that the water 
distribution facilities are exempt from taxation under Utah Const, art. XIII, § 2 to the 
extent that they are owned and used for irrigation. 
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PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On September 13, 2000, the Summit County Assessor requested that the 
Commission conduct an audit of Summit Water's personal property, which resulted 
in a personal property tax assessment against Summit Water's water distribution 
facilities. Summit Water appealed the assessment to the Summit County Board of 
Equalization and appeared before the Board on March 8, 2001. The Board issued 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on March 29,2001. 
On April 25,2001, Summit Water filed a Request for Redetermination of the 
Board of Equalization's decision with the Commission. Following an informal 
hearing on June 11, 2001, the Honorable Jane Phan issued an Order dated August 
14,2001, upholding the Board's decision. 
Summit Water appealed the Order on August 30, 2001, requesting a formal 
hearing before the Tax Commission. Summit County responded by filing a Motion 
for Summary Judgment which was granted in part and denied in part on February 
15, 2002. The remaining issues came before the Tax Commission for a formal 
adjudicative hearing on September 24, 2002. The Tax Commission issued its 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision on January 29, 2003. 
On February 18, 2003, Summit Water filed a Request for Reconsideration of 
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Decision of the Tax Commission. 
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On March 28, 2003, the Tax Commission issued an Order Denying Request for 
Reconsideration. 
Summit Water appealed the determination of the Tax Commission to the 
Third District Court for the State of Utah. Following briefing and argument, the 
Third District Court recused, and the appeal was reassigned to this court. 
Having read and considered all briefs and memoranda submitted, searched 
the record of the proceedings below to substantiate and clarify factual issues (the 
findings, analysis, and conclusions of the Tax Commission are not, however, directly 
relevant to this appeal], and heard the arguments of Summit Water, Summit County, 
and the Tax Commission, the court makes the following findings of fact and enters 
its conclusions of law. 
JURISDICTION, STANDARD OF REVIEW, AND 
BURDEN OF PROOP 
This court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601. Decisions of the 
Tax Commission are reviewed de novo, meaning an "original, independent 
proceeding" and not "a trial de novo on the record." Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-601(2]. 
The burden of proof on appeal is by a preponderance of the evidence, and rests 
upon the party seeking affirmative relief, namely, Summit Water. Utah Code Ann. § 
59-1-604. 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Summit Water is a Utah nonprofit mutual water company, which 
provides culinary grade water for the use of its shareholders. Summit Water's 
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish Summit Water's 
corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary water 
system and irrigation system for the use and benefit of the shareholders of the 
corporation." 
2. Summit Water has four classes of stock: Class A (Development) Stock; 
Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) Stock; Class C 
(Irrigation) Stock; and Class D (Snowmaking) Stock. 
3. Class A (Development) stock is issued in anticipation of new 
development and requires the shareholder to convey to Summit Water, or to 
commit from its own shares, a source of water and diversion works sufficient to 
meet such shareholder's proposed use. Class A stock must be converted to Class B 
stock to receive water and a proportionate residual ownership of Summit Water 
facilities. Class A stock represents a proportionate and specific interest in the 
company's domestic water, including the source site and source capacity, but no 
interest in Summit Water's water diversion and distribution facilities. 
Ruling Granting Petitioner's Appeal in Part 
No. 030923183 
Page 5 
4. Once Class A shareholders have met specified requirements in building 
and developing water service infrastructures so that water can flow from Summit 
Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A shareholder's property, Class A shares 
can be converted to Class B shares. Title to the new water service infrastructure is 
generally transferred to Summit Water at the time of conversion. Summit Water 
then provides water to its Class B shareholders, who are residential and commercial 
water users. 
5. Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) stock 
represents "an actual proportionate ownership interest in the water rights of the 
corporation as well as a corresponding interest in the diverting facilities, 
distribution works and water storage facilities." 
6. Class C (Irrigation) stock represents a portion of irrigation water 
conveyed through an independent system to shareholder lands under Summit 
Water's water rights. 
7. Class D (Snowmaking) stock is seasonally used for snowmaking 
purposes and similarly represents water under Summit Water's water rights that is 
delivered through an independent system and applied to shareholder lands. 
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8. Once a share of water from Summit Water attaches to a particular 
parcel of property, it becomes appurtenant thereto, and the water right cannot be 
sold or transferred separate from the property. 
9. Upon dissolution, Summit Water's shareholders will receive their 
proportionate share of the company's assets. (R. at 00715.) 
10. Summit Water provides water to properties where, for the most part, 
there is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties could 
not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes. 
11. In 2001, Summit Water provided water service to approximately 2,200 
individual residences and businesses. 
12. On average, 51% of the water provided by Summit Water to its 
shareholders' property is used for outdoor irrigation of lawns, shrubs, trees, and 
gardens. The remaining 49% is used for indoor domestic purposes, such as drinking 
water. (R. at 00939.) 
13. Summit Water's metering reveals the following annual percentages of 
irrigation use: 1996 - 44.3%; 1997 - 47.1%; 1998 - 38.9%; 1999 - 62.9%; 2000 -
57.7%. (R. at 00839.) 
14. Summit Water holds title to water diversion facilities, distribution 
works, and storage facilities "for and on behalf of its shareholders." (R. at 00901.) 
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15. Among the property hHil by Summit Water are, as defined by the Tax 
Commission, "water pipelines and substation facilities including pumping stations, 
underground storage facilities and well houses" (collectively, "Water DistriLintHH 
Facilities"}. (R. at 00197.) 
16. The Watei Distribution Facilities include approximately 75 miles of 
pipe;i• the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 118-119.) Approximately two-
thirds of that pipeline is laid in public utility easements along public roadways. i 
Much of the remaining one-third of the pipeline is looitocl on pnvali rights of way. 
(Id.) The pipeline occasionally no*;srs umln public roadways, but only a small 
fraction of the pipeline is actually laid under roadways. (R. at 00198.) In fact, of the 
75 miles of pipeline operated by Summit Water, this "small fraction" consists of 
merely one-half to three-fourths of a mile of pipeline1 flVix (.'omin'n Tr ;i1 114.) 
17. Tin1 pipeline an buried at least five feet underground. (Tax Comm'n 
I» at 7H, I Those pipelines are buried with the intent that they remain where buried 
for their useful life, i.e., until worn out or superseded by something mure suitable lor 
watenfetribirtieftr^^^ 
damage to the surface estate and the pipeline itself. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 120.) 
18. I In Water Distribution Facilities include ten storage reservoirs or 
tanks having an aggregate storage capacity of approximately 6,000,000 gallons. (R. 
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at 01060.] The storage reservoirs or tanks are located on private property and 
buried in the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 119,124-125.) 
19. The Water Distribution Facilities also include well houses, which are 
buildings with a "concrete floor and pumps that go down into the ground 900 feet in 
some cases" and have an electrical system. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 252.) 
20. Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights and 
a water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair 
market value than similarly situated real property that has no water rights or 
supply. The availability of water to a lot increases the value by 50% or more over a 
similar lot without water. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 132, 144-45,199-203; R. at 00209-
10.) 
21. Summit Water's By-laws provide for assessments of Class A, B, C, and D 
stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs (individual 
costs) to the shareholder causing such increased costs. For example, shareholders 
seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees, and shareholders 
whose lands lie at higher eleyations. and .require pumping are assessed the 
additional costs of pumping. 
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22. Personal property taxes assessed to Summit Water are also directly 
and entirely passed through to Summit Water shareholders in proportion to their 
share ownership. (R. at 00417, 00456-458.) 
23. Following an audit in 2000, the Tax Commission concluded that the 
market value of the Water Distribution Facilities was $5,126,592. (R. at 00635.) 
24. Based on the results of the audit, Summit Water's personal property 
taxes increased in 2000 by $56,200. (R. at 00634.) Summit County also assessed 
back taxes for the years 1996-1999 in the amount of $146,905.75, resulting in a 
total personal property tax bill for Summit Water in 2000 of $204,020.40. (R. at 
00698-702.) 
25. Summit Water has at least seven parcels of real property containing its 
facilities which are taxed as real property by Summit County. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 
222-23.) 
26. On February 21, 1992, the Summit County Assessor sent a letter to 
Summit Water expressly stating that "Section 59-2-11 gives exemption of property 
used for irrigation purposes. Under this category, water rights, ditches, canals, 
reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes, and flumes 
owned and used for irrigation purposes are exempt." (R. at 00375.) 
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27. The Summit County Assessor's office also sent to Summit Water a form 
document describing tax exemptions which expressly stated that "no formal 
application is required" to claim the irrigation tax exemption. (R. at 00524-25.) 
28. Summit County has no ordinance requiring the filing of an application 
or affidavit or the making of a personal appearance before its Board of Equalization 
as a prerequisite to claiming the irrigation tax exemption. 
29. Summit County has testified that nobody has ever submitted an 
application to Summit County for an irrigation exemption. (Ans. to Interrogs at 2, 
attached Exhibit "B.") 
ANALYSIS 
A. 
Taxable Personal Property 
At issue is Summit County's classification of the Water Distribution Facilities 
as personal property subject to personal property tax. 
Summit County's authority to tax real and personal property derives from the 
Property Tax Act. Utah Code Ann. §§ 59-2-101 etseq. Property subject to assessment 
and taxation according to its value under the Property Tax Act includes tangible 
personal property, defined as "(a] every class of property ... which is the subject of 
ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms 'real estate' and 
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'improvements'; [and] (b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or 
alleys[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27}. 
Under the Property Tax Act, "personal property" is a catch-all or remainder 
classification applied to tangible property; it is what is left after excluding real 
estate—not relevant to this appeal1—and "improvements." 
When this appeal arose, an "improvement" was defined by enumeration to 
include: 
"(a) ... all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements 
erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been acquired 
to the land or not." 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(16)(2002).2 
1
 Real estate consists essentially of land, minerals, timber and, somewhat 
paradoxically, improvements. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(30). 
2
 The definition of "improvement" was amended in 2004, and now reads in part as 
follows: 
(19)(a) Except as provided in Subsection (19)(c), "improvement" means a building, 
structure, fixture, fence, or other item that is permanently attached to land, regardless of 
whether the title has been acquired to the land, if: 
(i)(A) attachment to land is essential to the operation or use of the item; and 
(B) the manner of attachment to land suggests that the item will remain attached to 
the land in the same place over the useful life of the item; or 
(ii) removal of the item would: 
(A) cause substantial damage to the item; or 
(B) require substantial alteration or repair of a structure to which the item is 
attached. 
(b) "Improvement" includes: 
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Summit County's Position 
Summit County asserts that it properly classified and taxed the Water 
Distribution Facilities as personal property. Water Distribution Facilities comprised 
of "gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys" are expressly 
personal property under Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27)(b). All other parts of the 
Water Distribution Facilities are personal property pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 59-2-102(27)(a), since they are neither "real estate" nor "improvements." 
(i) an accessory to an item described [in subsection (a) above] .... 
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (19) (a) and (b), "improvement" does not include: 
(i) an item considered to be personal property pursuant to rules made in 
accordance with Section 59-2-107; 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(19]. 
The 2004 amendment was made retroactive to the start of the calendar tax year. It 
is not, therefore, controlling here. Nevertheless, since both Summit County and the Tax 
Commission in one way or another argued orally that the Tax Commission's rulemaking 
authority granted in Section 107 of the Property Tax Act should be dispositive of issues in 
this appeal, the court will address that proposition in passing. First, Section 107's 
nilemaking_aj^ session, and was not made 
retroactive, not even to the beginning of the tax year. No subsequent classification of water 
mains and pipes as personal property reaches back to the tax years under appeal. Second, 
no legislative history was presented suggesting that the 2004 amendment was intended to 
ratify any particular property classification scheme in existence prior to that time or to 
resolve any particular problem before the Legislature. Finally, the Tax Commission's 
subsequent exercise of this rulemaking authority should not be construed to permit the 
abrogation of a legislatively determined classification scheme. Rules promulgated pursuant 
to statutory authority must be consistent with such authority. 
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This second assertion, that Water Distribution Facilities other than those in 
roads, streets, or alleys are not improvements, requires explanation. While 
conceding that the facilities may be "affixed in some manner to various parcels of 
land" or "somewhat attached to the land," Summit County argues that mere 
affixation or attachment does not, without something more, make the facilities so 
affixed or attached "improvements" within the meaning of the Property Tax Act. In 
oral argument, Summit County suggested additional requirements might include 
permanent affixation or placement in perpetuity, the addition of value to the 
underlying property, and the holding of title to or some possessory right in the 
underlying property. 
To define further these additional requirements, Summit County cites 
Nickerson Pump & Machinery Co. v. State Tax Commission, 361 P.2d 520 (Utah 1961) 
and Colonial Pipeline Co. v. State Dep't of Assessments & Taxation, 806 A.2d 648 (Md. 
Ct. App. 2001]. From the first case, Summit County extracts a requirement that the 
placement of the Water Distribution Facilities must be dictated by their purpose and 
not a "mere convenience," such that the facilities cannot be moved about like a 
massive desk or large refrigerator. From the second case comes a business 
accessory test: property intended to be used for trade purposes, and not ancillary to 
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real property, is for that reason an accessory to a business in the nature of a "trade 
fixture/' and may therefore be classified and taxed as personal property. 
Summit County then concludes that since the Water Distribution Facilities are 
owned and controlled by Summit Water, and not by individual property owners, 
they are accessories to the business of Summit Water and not real property or 
improvements. Rather, the Water Distribution Facilities are property in the nature 
of trade fixtures, subject to personal property taxation in accordance with the 
Property Tax Act 
The State Tax Commission provides a further rationale. The classification of 
the Water Distribution Facilities as personal property does not make them personal 
property or real property. As with leasehold improvements in Holliday Water Co. v. 
Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970), the classification is merely a method of 
implementation of the taxation power. It does not matter whether the Water 
Distribution Facilities are real or personal property, so long as they are subject to 
taxation. Summit County may in its discretion classify, and assess and collect tax on, 
the Water Distribution Facilk4es^^^A^r-real^j^^rso^al-pj^pei^ 
Summit Water's Position 
Summit Water argues that the facilities are not taxable as personal property 
because they constitute improvements to real property under the relevant statute. 
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The Property Tax Act defines personal property as property "not included within 
the meaning of the terms 'real estate' and 'improvements^.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
102(27)(a). The statutory definition of "real estate or real property" expressly 
includes any "improvements" to land. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(30). 
"Improvements" are defined as "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and 
improvements erected upon or affixed to the land[.]" Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-
102(16) (2002). The Water Distribution Facilities are, for the most part, 
improvements for taxation purposes. The facilities may not be taxed, or classified 
for convenience and taxed, as personal property, in derogation of the express 
definition supplied by applicable legislation. 
The court agrees with the position advocated by Summit Water. 
Rules of Statutory Interpretation 
The role of the court in interpreting statutory language: 
is to give effect to the intent of the legislature in light of the purpose the 
statute was meant to achieve. To discover that intent, we look first to 
the plain language of the statute. In construing a statute, we assume 
that each term in the statute was used advisedly; thus the statutory 
words are read literally, unless such a reading is unreasonably 
confused or inoperable. 
State v. Bluff 52 P.3d 1210, 1221 (Utah 2002). "The fundamental rule of statutory 
construction is that statutes are generally to be construed according to their plain 
language. Unambiguous language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict 
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its plain meaning." Zoll & Branch, RC. v. Asay, 932 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 1997)." [W]e 
first examine the statute's plain language and resort to other methods of statutory 
interpretation only if the language is ambiguous. " State v. Masciantonio, 850 P.2d 
492, 493 (Utah Ct. App. 1993}. "It is presumed that a statute is valid and that the 
words and phrases used were chosen carefully and advisedly." Amax Magnesium 
Corp. v. State Tax Comm'n, 796 P.2d 1256, 1258 (Utah 1990), citing West Jordan v. 
Morrison, 656 P.2d 445, 446 (Utah 1982). Accordingly, the words of a statute are 
read literally, giving them their usual and accepted meaning, unless such a reading 
produces an absurd result, or is unreasonably confused or inoperable. 
The plain language of the Property Tax Act is unambiguous: "improvements" 
are not personal property. To be an "improvement," property must be "erected upon 
or affixed to the land." The erected or affixed property need not be permanent, or 
placed in perpetuity, or add value to the underlying land. The underlying land need 
not be owned by the person owning the erected or affixed property. Since the 
Property Tax Act definitions are unambiguous, no other rules of statutory 
interpretation need be consulted as to legislative intent, and the words of the 
pertinent definitions may be given their usual and accepted meaning. 
Moreover, as interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court, there is only a single 
test determinative of whether or not something is an improvement: whether it is 
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"erected upon or affixed to the land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt, 912 P.2d 961, 
968 (Utah 1996). All additional requirements have been expressly disavowed, and 
prior contrary holdings and dicta overruled. Ownership of the property to be 
classified for tax purposes or the real property to which it is affixed or upon which it 
is erected is not relevant, nor is it in dispute whether "affixation" includes "burial." 
The water mains and pipes comprising the Water Distribution Facilities are 
incontrovertibly "erected upon or affixed to the land," and are therefore 
improvements; and except for "water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or 
alleys," which are expressly excluded, they are not personal property or taxable as 
personal property under the Property Tax Act. 
In addition to water mains and pipes not laid in roads, streets, or alleys, "all 
buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements erected upon or affixed to 
the land, whether the title has been acquired to the land or not," are 
"improvements" not includable with personal property for purposes of assessment 
and taxation under the Property Tax Act. 
There-fee^ex^eptJoiima or other 
property which is neither real property nor an improvement under the statutory 
definition, the Water Distribution Facilities for purposes of assessment and taxation 
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are expressly "improvements" that are taxable as real property, and not personal 
property or any other class of property taxable as personal property. 
The holding in Crossroads Plaza is worth reviewing again. First, the issue 
actually decided involved whether a tax on leasehold improvements or fixtures 
could be enforced against the lessee, the lessor, or both. While concurrently 
clarifying the correct interpretation of the statutory definition of "improvement," 
thereby ending any controversy or ambiguity in meaning, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that the particular administrative rule and enabling statute permitted the tax 
assessed on leasehold improvements to attach as a lien on both the improvement 
and the underlying real property to which the improvements were affixed, and was 
therefore enforceable against both the lessee and the lessor. Crossroads Plaza does 
not support the proposition that a special type of improvement, namely leasehold 
improvements, which may sometimes be called trade fixtures, can be taxed as either 
personal property or real property.3 
Summit County nevertheless observes that the interpretation of a statute 
should not yield a confused, inconsistent, nonsensical or even absurd result, calling 
attention to the illogic in the classification of mains and pipes, when laid under 
3
 Any contrary holding in Nickerson Pump was expressly overruled by Crossroads 
Plaza. Citation to the decisional law of other jurisdictions, given the existence of clear 
guidance in Utah, is also inappropriate, and Colonial Pipeline will not be considered. 
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public roads, streets, or alleys, as "personal property" and, when buried elsewhere, 
"improvements." Under a rigid application of the statutory definition, Summit 
Water's mains and pipes may indeed transition between personal property and 
improvements many times as they progress from water collection and storage 
facilities to the user terminus. This chameleon-like behavior applies 
notwithstanding the lack of any physical change in the actual mains and pipes other 
than their location, and, in that regard, the mains and pipes themselves remain 
owned and controlled by Summit Water, not the property owners across whose land 
the mains and pipes run. Thus we have the paradox of a pipe that is personal 
property for some distance, then real property, then personal property again. 
As to any perceived absurdity, inconsistency, or illogic, the court is reminded 
of the admonition given by Professor Clifton Fleming at the outset of his course in 
Federal tax law some decades ago, which, paraphrased, was "don't try to understand 
or make sense of the rules, just memorize them." 
Whether mains and pipes are personal or real property for assessment and 
taxation purposes under the Property Tax Act is a matter of definition and 
classification within the purview of the Legislature, and the court knows of no 
impediment to the Legislature's exercise of that power in the enactment of the 
taxation scheme before it. With the exception of mains and pipes laid in public 
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roads, the Water Distribution Facilities are properly classified as "improvements" 
wherever "erected upon or affixed to the land/1 The express statutory language 
neither contains, suggests, nor requires anything more. 
B. 
Double Taxation 
Summit Water contends that taxation of its Water Distribution Facilities as 
personal property would result in the unconstitutional double taxation of its 
shareholders. The applicable law, as stated In McCormick & Co. v. Bassett, is as 
follows: 
These provisions [Sections 2 and 3, Article XIII] of the Constitution in 
plain and explicit terms provide that there shall be a uniform rate of 
taxation in this state so that every person, company, and corporation 
will be compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his, her, or its pro rata of 
the burdens of general taxation according to the value of the taxable 
property of such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated 
that, when property is once assessed for general taxes according to its 
value and at the same rate as other property subject to the same tax is 
assessed, it may again be taxed in some other way when the burden of 
both taxes falls on the same person, and while other property subject 
to the same tax is assessed but once. 
164 P. 852, 854 (Utah 1917), quoted in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 
371, 373 (Utah 1970) 
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Summit Water's Position 
Summit Water is a mutual water company. Costs of operation, including taxes 
assessed to Summit Water, are passed through to, and paid by, Summit Water's 
shareholders in proportion to the class and amount of stock held. 
Real property taxes are based upon the.assessed market value of the property 
taxed. The provision of water to real property increases the property's fair market 
value by 50% or more. The right to receive a distribution of water is appurtenant to 
the shareholder's property, and proportionate to the class and number of shares 
held. Since the only difference between lesser valued property without water and 
more valuable property with water is the water supplied, the value of the supply 
system is necessarily reflected and included in the increased market value of the 
properties served. 
If Summit County is permitted to tax the Water Distribution Facilities 
separately as personal property, the facilities would not be equally taxed with other 
personal property or bear their fair share of the tax burden, but would be taxed 
twi£e^ojic£ in the personal property tax which would be passed through or assessed 
to, and paid by, Summit Water's shareholders, and again in the increased value of 
the shareholders' properties receiving a distribution of water. Thus Summit Water's 
shareholders would bear the burden of a double and impermissible tax on the 
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Water Distribution Facilities in the modalities of increased operating costs 
assessments and increased real property taxes. 
Summit County's position 
Summit County responds that Summit Water's shareholders who own real 
property are taxed based on the fair market value of their individual properties. The 
assessment does not include a separate valuation of the water available to the 
property, whether supplied by Summit Water or another source, or a separate pro 
rata share of the value of the water distribution facilities providing the water. 
Therefore, the taxation of Summit Water's distribution facilities as personal 
property does not amount to double taxation because the value of the facilities is not 
included in the assessment applicable to individual shareholders.4 
The Tax Commission adds that the increased market value of the real 
property is based on the market's response to the availability of water, and has no 
relation to the pro rata value per shareholder of the Water Distribution Facilities. In 
4
 Summit County also suggests that, first, Summit Water is taxed on a consistent 
basis with other water companies throughout Utah and, second, the Supreme Court's 
decision in Holliday Water Co. v. Lambourne, 466 P.2d 371 (Utah 1970), permits double 
taxation. The practice of Summit County, or other counties, in the taxation of private water 
distribution companies is not proof of correctness. With regard to the second argument, 
Holliday Water never reached the issue of double taxation because the Supreme Court 
found that the water company had not submitted evidence to prove double taxation. 
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other words, it is the water that adds value captured by assessment, not the water 
distribution system, the value of which is not part of the assessment. 
The court concurs with the views of Summit County and the Tax Commission. 
Summit Water is a legal entity having a separate and independent existence 
from its shareholders. The taxation of one is not necessarily the taxation of the 
other. 
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
assessed valuation of the real property owned by its shareholders and serviced by 
its Water Distribution Facilities includes the shareholder's proportional share of the 
value of the facilities. 
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence the 
amount, if any, of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities that was, is, or would 
be included in the valuation of the real property owned by its shareholders and 
serviced by the facilities. 
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that any 
increase- m the assessed valuation of real property serviced by the Water 
Distribution Facilities is solely attributable to the value of the facilities. 
Even assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to the value of the 
facilities, Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that 
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the 50% increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the water 
made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is a proper measure of the value 
of the facilities. 
Summit Water has not shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the water made 
available by the Water Distribution Facilities corresponds to the proportional value 
of the facilities imputable to the shareholder. In other words, there is insufficient 
evidence correlating the use of the Water Distribution Facilities by a given parcel, 
the parcel's proportionate share of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities 
based on such use, and any increase in the value of the parcel attributable to the 
water supplied. 
Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that, if 
the Water Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount of the tax would be passed 
on to its shareholders in proportion to the increase in value to the shareholder's 
property that is attributable to the water supplied by the facilities by the property. 
In -fact,-the classes of shareholders would appear to bear apportionment and 
assessment of operating expenses differently, based on class and number of shares 
held, without taking into account the nature and extent of water usage or the 
distance between the source and terminus. 
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Finally, the logic underlying the double taxation argument is specious. 
Property values are impacted by many factors, including whether one's neighbors 
maintain or fail to maintain their properties, or a big box store is built next door, or 
the property is surrounded by parks, schools, green space, or other public amenities. 
Just because nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a property's 
fair market value, we may not conclude that the value of those facilities or buildings 
necessarily corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that the facilities and 
buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be taxed differently. 
The court concludes that Summit Water has not carried its burden of proof in 
establishing that, if the Water Distribution Facilities were separately taxed as 
personal property, there would be an impermissible variation in the manner in 
which the facilities are taxed compared to other personal property, or that the 
Water Distribution Facilities would be taxed twice to its shareholders. 
C. 
The Irrigation Tax Exemption 
The power to tax is granted to the legislative branch by the people through 
the instrumentality of the Utah Constitution. Article XIII, Section 2 provides: 
(1) So that each person and corporation pays a tax in proportion 
to the fair market value of his, her, or its tangible property, all tangible 
property in the State that is not exempt under the laws of the United 
States or under this Constitution shall be: 
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(a) assessed at a uniform and equal rate in proportion to its fair 
market value, to be ascertained as provided by law; and 
(b) taxed at a uniform and equal rate. 
(2) Each corporation and person in the State or doing business 
in the State is subject to taxation on the tangible property owned or 
used by the corporation or person within the boundaries of the State or 
local authority levying the tax. 
The power to tax is to be exercised with restraint. The power to tax property-
is expressly limited by sections of the Utah Constitution. Pertinent here is the so-
called irrigation exemption contained in Article XIII, Section 3: 
(1) The following are exempt from property tax: 
(i) water rights, reservoirs, pumping plants, ditches, canals, 
pipes, flumes, power plants, and transmission lines to the extent owned 
and used by an individual or corporation to irrigate land that is: 
(i) within the State; and 
(if) owned by the individual or corporation, or by an individual 
member of the corporation.5 
A constitutional limitation of or exemption from the power to tax, such as the 
irrigation exemption, must be strictly observed by the legislative branch, enforced 
by the executive branch with exactitude, precision, and particularity, neither 
5
 Prior to January 1, 2003, the exemption read as follows: 
Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or 
corporations for irrigating lands within the state owned by such individuals 
or corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from 
taxation to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
Utah Constitution, art XIII, § 2(5). 
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exceeding nor abusing the express power, and interpreted by the judicial branch 
with deference to legislative intent within the plain meaning and scope of the 
language of the limitation. 
Judicial construction of the language of the Utah Constitution begins with its 
plain meaning, and follows rules similar to those applicable to statutory 
construction. 
Summit Water argues that the Water Distribution Facilities, to the extent used 
for the supply of water for irrigation purposes, are constitutionally exempt from 
taxation. As used in the Utah Constitution, "to irrigate land" includes all artificial 
watering of lands. Summit Water concedes that water used for culinary purposes is 
outside the exemption. 
Summit County essentially argues that the constitutional exemption extends 
to irrigation for agricultural purposes only, and then only to facilities used 
"exclusively" for agricultural irrigation. The mere fact that some of the water 
supplied by Summit Water is used for the watering of residential lawns, household 
gardens, and ornamental trees, or shrubs, does not afford Summit Water the 
irrigation exemption. 
The court disagrees. 
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The Utah Constitution was amended subsequent to the Holliday Water 
Company v. Lambourne case cited by Summit County to remove the word 
"exclusively" and insert in its place the phrase "to the extent." Thus, the 
constitutional exemption from taxation applies "to the extent" water distribution 
systems are owned and used for irrigation. "Irrigate" has a general meaning of 
supplying water artificially to land, and the amendment did not limit irrigation to 
agricultural land. Secondly, while not dispositive in the sense of constituting the 
holding of any case, use of the words "irrigation" and "irrigate" by the Utah Supreme 
Court has generally included water used for non-agricultural purposes, including 
the watering of lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubbery, trees, and vegetation 
indigenous to a particular property. See, e.g., In re Gen. Determination of Water 
Rights, 98 P.3d 1 (Utah 2004) (irrigation of indigenous vegetation); Mt. Olivet 
Cemetery Ass'n. v. Salt Lake City, 235 P. 876, 880 (Utah 1925) (irrigation of city lots 
and cemetery grounds). 
Based on a plain meaning interpretation of the exemption contained in the 
Constitution, and in view of the meaning implicit in decisions of the Utah Supreme 
Court, the court concludes that to the extent the Water Distribution Facilities are 
used to convey water for the artificial watering of a shareholders' property, whether 
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residential, commercial, or agricultural, those facilities are within the constitutional 
irrigation exemption and therefore exempt from taxation. 
The record establishes that 51% of the water distributed by Summit Water 
through its Water Distribution Facilities is used for irrigation purposes, while the 
remaining 49% is used for culinary or household purposes. It follows that "to the 
extent" that the Water Distribution Facilities are used for irrigation purposes, 
namely 51%, those facilities cannot be taxed as personal property as sought by 
Summit County. 
Finally, Summit County argues that the irrigation exemption is not available 
because Summit Water did not file an application. The irrigation exemption is 
Constitutional and applies whether an application is made or not. It may not be 
abridged or abrogated by administrative requirements. Moreover, Summit County 
may waive any application requirement. Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1102(3)(b). A 
representative of Summit County notified Summit Water that no application was 
necessary and none had ever been required. Thus Summit County by its actions 
waived the application requirement for the irrigation exemption. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Water Distribution Facilities, consisting of pipes and mains not laid in 
roads, streets, or alleys, together with "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and 
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improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been 
acquired to the land or not/' are "improvements" not includable with personal 
property for purposes of assessment and taxation under the Property Tax Act. 
The separate taxation of the Water Distribution Facilities as personal 
property would not constitute impermissible double taxation. 
The Water Distribution Facilities are exempt from taxation under Article XIII, 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution to the extent that they are owned and used for the 
artificial watering of real property. 
Summit Water was not required to make application for the irrigation 
exemption or, alternatively, any such requirement was waived by Summit County. 
ORDER 
The attorneys for Summit Water will please prepare an appropriate order 
implementing the foregoing findings and conclusions. 
Dated this 31st day of August, 2009. 
JoKn R. Morris, Judge 
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The above-entitled matter came before the Court on Petitioner Summit 
Water Distribution Company's ("Summit Water"), appeal from the Order of the 
Utah State Tax Commission (BTa* Commission"), granting Partial Summary 
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Judgment in favor of the Summit County Board of Equalization ("Summit 
County"), dated February 15, 2002, and from the Tax Commission's Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final ,'Decision, dated January 29, 2003. Having 
read and considered all briefs and memoranda submitted, searched the record of 
the proceedings below to substantiate and clarify factual issues, and heard the 
arguments of Summit Water, Summit County, and the Tax Commission, the 
Court makes Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Orders as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Summit Water is a Utah nonprofit mutual water company, which 
provides culinary grade water for the use of its shareholders. Summit Water's 
Amended and Restated Articles of Incorporation establish Summit Water's 
corporate purpose as "the installation and operation of a general culinary water 
system and irrigation system for the use and benefit of the shareholders of the 
corporation." 
2. Summit Water has four classes of stock: Class A (Development 
Stock; Class B (Residential and Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) Stock; Class 
C (Irrigation) Stock; and Class D (Snowmaking) Stock. 
3. Class A (Development) stock is issued in anticipation of new 
development and requires the shareholder to convey to Summit Water, or to 
commit from its own shares, a source of water and diversion works sufficient to 
2 
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meet such shareholder's proposed wse. Class A stock must be converted to 
Class B stock to receive water and a proportionate residual ownership of Summit 
Water facilities. Class A stock represents a proportionate and specific interest In 
the company's domestic water, including the source site and source capacity, but 
no interest in Summit Water's water diversion and distribution facilities. 
4. Once Class A shareholders have met specified requirements in 
building and developing water service infrastructures so that water can flow from 
Summit Water's existing infrastructure to the Class A shareholder's property, 
Class A shares can be converted to Class B shares. Title to the new water 
service infrastructure is generally transferred to Summit Water at the time of 
conversion. Summit Water then provides water to its Class B shareholders, who 
are residential and commercial water users. 
5. Class B (Residential ar)d Commercial Culinary and Irrigation) stock 
represents "an actual proportionate ownership interest in the water rights of the 
corporation as well as a corresponding interest in the diverting facilities, 
distribution works and water storage'facilities," 
6. Class C (Irrigation) stlpck represents a portion of irrigation water 
conveyed through an independent,! system to shareholder lands under Summit 
Water's water rights. 
3 
O C H 5 - 2 0 0 9 THU 10:03 AM SECOND DISTRICT COURT FAX NO. 8014473881 
7. Class D (Snowmaking) stock Is seasonally used for snowmaking 
purposes and similarly represents water under Summit Water's water rights that 
is delivered through an independent system and applied to shareholder lands. 
8. Once a share of water from Summit Water attaches to a particular 
parcel of property. It becomes appurtenant thereto, and the water right cannot be 
sold or transferred separate from the property. 
9. Upon dissolution, Summit Water's shareholders will receive their 
proportionate share of the company's assets. (R. at 00715.) 
10. Summit Water provides t/vater to properties where, for the most part, 
there is no municipal water source available. Without water these properties 
could not be developed for either residential or commercial purposes. 
11. In 2001, Summit Water provided water service to approximately 
2,200 individual residences and businesses. 
12. On average, 51% of the water provided by Summit Water to its 
shareholders' property is used for Outdoor irrigation of lawns, shrubs, trees, and 
gardens. The remaining 49% is used for indoor domestic purposes, such as 
drinking water. (R. at 00939.) 
13. Summit Water's metering reveals the following annual percentages 
of irrigation use: 1996 - 44.3%; 1997 - 47.1%; 1998 - 38.9%; 1999 - 62.9%; 
2000-57.7%. (R. at 00839.) 
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14. Summit Water holds title to water diversion facilities, distribution 
works, and storage facilities "for and on behalf of its shareholders." (R. at 
00901.) 
15. Among the property help" by Summit Water are, as defined by the 
Tax Commission, "water pipelines and substation facilities including pumping 
stations, underground storage facilities and well houses" (collectively, "Water 
Distribution Facilities"). (R. at 00197})) 
16. The Water Distribution Facilities include approximately 75 miles of 
pipeline buried in the ground. (Tax Cfomm'n Tr. at 118-119.) Approximately two-
thirds of that pipeline is laid in public utility easements along public roadways, 
((d.) Much of the remaining one-third of the pipeline is located on private rights of 
way. (id.) The pipeline occasionally crosses under public roadways, but only a 
small fraction of the pipeline is actually laid under roadways. (R. at 00198.) In 
fact, of the 75 miles of pipeline operated by Summit Water, this "small fraction" 
consists of merely one-half to threehfourths of a mile of pipeline. (Tax Comm'n 
Tr.at114.) 
17. The pipelines are buffed at least five feet underground. (Tax 
Comm'n Tr. at 78.) Those pipelines are buried with the intent that they remain 
where buried for their useful life, La , until worn out or superseded by something 
more suitable for water distribution, and may be removed or replaced only by 
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excavation at the risk of damage to the surface state and the pipeline itself. (Tax 
Comm'n Tr. at 120.) 
16. The Water Distribution Facilities include ten storage reservoirs or 
tanks having an aggregate storage capacity of approximately 6,000,000 gallons. 
(R. at 01060.) The storage reservoirs or tanks are located on private property 
and buried in the ground. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 119,124-125.) 
19. The Water Distribution Facilities also include well houses, which are 
buildings with a "concrete floor and pumps that go down into the ground 900 feet 
In some cases" and have an electrical system. {Tax Comm'n Tr. at 252.) 
20. Real property in Summit County that has appurtenant water rights 
and a water supply to the property available for use has a significantly higher fair 
market value than similarly situated real property that has no water rights or 
supply. The availability of water to alllot increases the value by 50% or more over 
a similar lot without water. (Tax Comm'n Tr. at 132, 144-45, 199-203; R. at 
00209-10.) 
21 . Summit Water's By-law^ provide for assessments of Class A, B, C, 
and D stock in such a manner as to directly allocate increased separate costs 
(individual costs) to the shareholder-'icausing such increased costs. For example, 
shareholders seeking a connection are assessed the costs of connection fees, 
6 
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and shareholders whose lands lie at||higher elevations and require pumping are 
assessed the additional costs of pumping. 
22. Personal property taxes assessed to Summit Water are also directly 
and entirely passed through to Summit Water shareholders in proportion to their 
share ownership. (R. at 00417,00456-458.) 
23. Following an audit in 2000, the Tax Commission concluded that the 
market value of the Water Distribution Facilities was $5,126,592. (R. at 00635.) 
24. Based on the results of tie audit, Summit Water's personal property 
taxes increased in 2000 by $56,200. (R, at 00634.) Summit County also 
assessed back taxes for the years 1906-1999 in the amount of $146,905.75, 
resulting in a total personal property tax bill for Summit Water in 2000 of 
$204,020.40. (R. at 00698-702.) 
25. Summit Water has at least seven parcels of real property containing 
its facilities which are taxed as realj|property by Summit County. (Tax Comm'n 
Tr. at 222-23.) 
26. On February 21,1992, f he Summit County Assessor sent a letter to 
Summit Water expressly stating that "Section 59-2-11 gtves exemption of 
property used for irrigation purposes. Under the category, water rights, ditches, 
canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, transmission lines, pipes, and 
flumes owned and used for irrigation purposes are exempt." (R. at 00375.) 
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27. The Summit County Assessor's office also sent to Summit Water a 
form document describing tax exemptions which expressly stated that "no formal 
application Is required" to claim the lojlgation tax exemption. (R. at 00524-25.) 
28. Summit County has no ordinance requiring the filing of an 
application or affidavit or the making Df a personal appearance before its Board 
of Equalization as a prerequisite to claiming the irrigation tax exemption. 
29. Summit County has testified that nobody has ever submitted an 
application to Summit County for an (irrigation exemption. (Ans. to Interrogs at 2, 
attached Exhibit "B.") 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
A. Jurisdiction, Standard of Review, and Burden of Proof 
1. The court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann, § 59-1-601. 
Decisions of the Tax Commission are reviewed de novo, meaning an "original, 
independent proceeding" and not "a trial de novo on the record," Utah Code 
Ann, § 59-1-601(2). The burden of proof on appeal is by a preponderance of the 
evidence, and rests upon the party seeking affirmative relief, namely, Summit 
Water. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-604. 
B. Taxable Personal Properly 
2. Summit County's authority to tax real and personal property derives 
from the Property Tax Act, Utah Coiile Ann. §§ 59-2-101 et seq. Property subject 
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to assessment and taxation according to its value under the Property Tax Act 
includes tangible property, defined as!i"(a) every class of property... which Is the 
subject of ownership and not included within the meaning of the terms 'real 
estate' and 'improvements'; [and] (8) gas and water mains and pipes laid in 
roads, streets, or alleys[.f Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(27). 
3. Under the Property Tax Act, "personal property" is a catch-all or 
remainder classification applied to tangible property; it is what is left after 
excluding real estate and "improvements.'1 
4. The statutory definition of "real estate or real property* expressly 
includes any "improvements" to land Utah Code Ann. § 69-2-102(3). 
5. When this appeal arose, an "improvement" was defined by 
enumeration to include: "(a) ... all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and 
Improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title has been 
acquired to the land or not." Utah Cqjde Ann. § 59-2-102(16) (2002). 
6. "The fundamental rule of statutory construction is that statutes are 
generally to be construed according to their plain language. Unambiguous 
language in the statute may not be interpreted to contradict its plain meaning." 
Zoll & Branch. P.C.v.Asav. 932 P.Zd 592,594 (Utah 1997). 
7. The plain language of the Property Tax Act is unambiguous: 
"improvements" are not personal property. 
9 
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8. To be an "improvement," property must be "erected upon or affixed 
to the land." The erected or affixed property need not be permanent, or placed in 
perpetuity, or add value to the underlying land. The underlying land need not be 
owned by the person owning the erected or affixed property. 
9. Because the Property Tax Act definitions are unambiguous, no other 
rules of statutory interpretation need fre consulted as to legislative intent, and the 
words of the pertinent definitions may be gfven their usual and accepted 
meaning, 
10. As interpreted by the Uicjh Supreme Court, there is only a single test 
determinative of whether or not something is an improvement: whether it is 
"erected upon of affixed to the land." Crossroads Plaza Ass'n v. Pratt. 912 P.2d 
961, 968 (Utah 1996). All additional requirements have been expressly 
disavowed, and prior contrary holdings and dicta overruled. Ownership of the 
property to be classified for tax purposes or the real property to which it is affixed 
or upon which It is erected is not relevant, nor is it in dispute whether "affixation" 
includes "burial." 
11. The water mains and Dipes comprising the Water Distribution 
Facilities are Incontrovertibly "erected upon or affixed to the land," and are 
therefore improvements; and excepit for "water mains and pipes laid in roads, 
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streets, or alleys," which are expressly excluded, they are not personal property 
or taxable as personal property under Ithe Property Tax Act. 
12. In addition to the water mains and pipes not laid in roads, streets, or 
alleys, "all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, and improvements erected upon 
or affixed to the land, whether the titlfe has been acquired to the land or not," are 
"improvements* not includable wjith personal property for purposes of 
assessment and taxation under the Property Tax Act. 
13. Therefore, except for mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or 
alleys, or other property which is neither real property nor an Improvement under 
the statutory definition, the Water Distribution Facilities for purposes of 
assessment and taxation are expressly "improvements'' that are not includable 
with personal property for purposes of assessment and taxation under the 
Property Tax Act. 
C. Double Taxation 
14. Article XIII, sections 2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution provide that 
"there shall be a uniform rate of taxation in this state so that every person, 
company, and corporation will be compelled to bear, as nearly as may be, his, 
her, or its pro rata of the burdens of general taxation according to the value of the 
taxable property of such person or corporation. And it is not contemplated that, 
when property is once assessed fon general taxes according to its value and at 
11 
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the same rate as other property subject to the same tax is assessed, it may again 
be taxed in some other way when the burden of both taxes fails on the same 
person, and while other property subject to the same tax is assessed but once." 
McCormicK & Co. v. Bassett. 164 P.3|d 852, 854 (Utah 1917), quoted in Hofliday 
Water Co. v. Lambourne. 466 P.2d 3711,373 (Utah 1970). 
15. Summit Water is a legal! entity having a separate and Independent 
existence from its shareholders. TJhe taxation of one Is not necessarily the 
taxation of the other. 
16. Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the assessed valuation of the real property owned by its 
shareholders and serviced by its Water Distribution Facilities includes the 
shareholder's proportional share of tBe value of the facilities, 
17. Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence the amount, if any, of the value of the Water Distribution Facilities that 
was, is, or would be included in the, valuation of the real property owned by its 
shareholders and serviced by the facilities. 
18. Summit Water has fafled to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that any increase in the assessed valuation of real property serviced by 
the Water Distribution Facilities is sojely attributable to the value of the facilities. 
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19. Even assuming that any such increase is solely attributable to the 
value of the facilities, Summit Water |has failed to show by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the 50% increase in the assessed valuation of real property 
attributable to the water made available by the Water Distribution Facilities is a 
proper measure of the value of the facilities. 
20. Summit Water has not 4hown by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the increase in the assessed valuation of real property attributable to the 
water made available by the Wateir Distribution Facilities corresponds to the 
proportional value of the facilities imputable to the shareholder. In other words, 
there is Insufficient evidence correlating the use of the Water Distribution 
Facilities by a given parcel, the parcel's proportionate share of the value of the 
Water Distribution Facilities based on such use, any increase in the value of the 
parcel attributable to the water supplied. 
21. Summit Water has failed to show by a preponderance of the 
evidence that, if the Water Distribution Facilities were taxed, the amount of the 
tax would be passed on to its shareholders in proportion to the increase in value 
to the shareholders' property that is attributable to the water supplied by the 
facilities by the property. In fact, tfte classes of shareholders would appear to 
bear apportionment and assessment of operating expenses differently, based on 
13 
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class and number of shares held, without taking into account the nature and 
jjj extent of water usage or the distance between the source and terminus. 
& 22. Although nearby facilities and buildings may increase or decrease a 
| property's fair market value, it cannot be concluded that the value of those 
facilities or buildings necessarily corresponds to the increase or decrease, or that 
the facilities and buildings should not therefore be taxed, or should be taxed 
differently. 
23. Summit Water has not carried its burden of proof In establishing that, 
if the Water Distribution Facilities were separately taxed as personal property, 
there would be an impermissible variation in the manner in which the facilities are 
taxed compared to other personal property, or that the Water Distribution 
Facilities would be taxed twice to its shareholders. 
24. The separate taxation of (the Water Distribution Facilities as personal 
property would not constitute double taxation. 
D. Irrigation Tax Exemption 
25. The power to tax property is expressly limited by the Utah 
Constitution. Pertinent here Is the so-called irrigation exemption contained in 
Article XIII, Section 3: 
(1) The following are exempt from property tax: ... (i) water rights, 
reservoirs, pumping plants, ditches, canals, pipes, flumes, power 
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plants, and transmission lines to the extent owned and used by 
an individual or corporation irrigate land that is: (i) within the 
state; and (ii) owned by the individual or corporation, or by an 
individual member of the corporation. 
26. A constitutional limitation of or exemption from the power to tax, 
such as the Irrigation exemption, must be strictly observed by the legislative 
branch, enforced by the executive! branch with exactitude, precision, and 
particularity, neither exceeding nor abusing the express power, and interpreted 
by the judicial branch with deference Ito legislative intent within the plain meaning 
and scope of the language of the limitation. 
27. Judicial construction of tfte language of the Utah Constitution begins 
with its plain meaning and follows riiiles similar to those applicable to statutory 
construction. 
28. The Utah Constitution was amended subsequent to Hollidav Water 
Company v, Lambourne. 466 P.2i3 371 (Utah 1970), to remove the word 
"exclusively" and Insert in its place the phrase "to the extent." Thus, the 
constitutional irrigation exemption from taxation applies "to the extent" water 
distribution systems are owned and used for irrigation. "Irrigate" has a general 
meaning of supplying water artificiapy to land, and the amendment did not limit 
irrigation to agricultural land. 
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29. Use of the words "irrigation" and "irrigate" by the Utah Supreme 
Court has generally included water used for non-agricultural purposes, including 
the watering of lawns, grass, flowers, ornamental shrubbery, trees, and 
vegetation indigenous to a particular properly. See, e.g.. In re Gen. 
Determination of Water Rights. 98 p.3d 1 (Utah 2004); Mt. Olivet Cemetery 
Ass'n. v. Salt Lake Citv. 235 P 876,8B0 (Utah 1925). 
30. Based on a plain meaning interpretation of the exemption contained 
in the Constitution, and In view of the meaning implicit in decisions of the Utah 
Supreme Court, to the extent that tfoe Water Distribution Facilities are used to 
convey water for the artificial wateiring of a shareholders' property, whether 
residential, commercial, or agricultural, those facilities are within the 
constitutional irrigation exemption ana therefore exempt from taxation. 
31. The Water Distribution facilities are therefore exempt from taxation 
under Article XIII, Section 2 of the U/tah Constitution to the extent that they are 
owned and used for the artificial watering of real property. 
32. Because the record establishes that 51% of the water distributed by 
Summit Water through its Water Distribution Facilities is used for irrigation 
purposes, 51% of those facilities cannot be taxed. 
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33. The irrigation exemption!! is constitutional and applies whether an 
application is made or not. It may noij|be abridged or abrogated by administrative 
requirements. 
34. Moreover, Summit County may waive any application requirement. 
Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-1102(3)(b). A representative of Summit County notified 
Summit Water that no application Was necessary and none had ever been 
required. Thus Summit County by itsjjactions waived any application requirement 
for the irrigation exemption. 
35. Summit Water was not required to make application for the irrigation 
exemption or, alternatively, any such requirement was waived by Summit 
County. 
pRDER 
Based upon the foregoing findings of fact and conclusions of law, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 
1. Summit Water's Water distribution Facilities are "improvements" to 
real property and, with the exception'iof the water pipes laid in roads, streets, or 
alleys, are not includable as personal property for purposes of assessment and 
taxation under the Property Tax Act; 
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2. Fifty-one (51) percent of Summit Water's Water Distribution Facilities 
are exempt from taxation under the'i irrigation exemption found in Article XIII, 
Section 2 of the Utah Constitution; aniil, 
3. Taxation of Summit Water's Water Distribution Facilities as personal 
property, to the extent allowed iby this decision, would not constitute 
impermissible double taxation. 
DATED this fc»r day of S^Sff l^-2009. 
BY THE COURT; 
Attorneys for Summit County 
Board of Equalization 
Attorneys for Utah State Tax Comm'tii 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused la true and correct copy of the within and 
foregoing FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER to be 
mailed, postage prepaid, this of September, 2009, to the following: 
Jam! R. Brackin 
David L. Thomas 
Summit County Attorney 
60 North Main Street 
Coalville, Utah 84017 
Timothy A. Bodily 
Utah State Tax: Commission 
160 East 300 South, S^lfloor 
P.O. Box 140874 
Salt Lake City, Utah 841 ft4 
•>*r6i >& 
611 (1X3S13V2 
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Dictionary 
irresoluteness—irritability 2741 
Ir -re s ' -o - lu te -nes s , s. [Eng. irresolute; 
-ness.] The quality or state of being irreso-
lute ; want of firmness of purpose; hesita-
tion, irresolution. 
ir-res-o-lu'-t ion, s. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and 
Eng. resolution (q.v.).] Want of resolution or 
firmness of purpose; want of decision ; inde-
cision ; hesitation; fluctuation or wavering of 
the mind. 
" He had by hia irresolution forfeited the favour of 
William."—Macaulay : Hitt. Eng,, ch. xvi i . 
* fr-re-solv-a-bil ' - i -ty, s. [Eng. irresolva-
ble ; -ity.\ The quality or state of being irre-
solvable. 
Ir-re-solv'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. resolvable (q.v.).] Incapable of being 
resolved. 
« i r -re-solv ' -a-ble-ness , a. [Eng. irresolv- i 
able ; -ness.] *The quality or state of being 
irresolvable; irresolvability. 
* lr-re-solved' , a. [Pref. ir-—in- (2), and 
Eng. resolved (q.v.).] Not resolved, not 
settled in opinion, undetermined. 
"While a person is irresolved, he suffers all the force 
of temptation to call upon him."—StUlingfleet: Ser-
mons, voL iv.t ser. 11. 
* Ir-re-solv'-ed-ly , adv. [Eng. irresolved; 
-ly.] Without settled opinion; hesitatingly, 
doubtfully. 
" Divers of my friends have thought i t strange to 
hear me speak so irresolvedly."—Boyle : Works, iii . 198. 
I r - r e s - p e c f - i v e , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. respective (q.v.).J 
1. Not respective or having regard to cir-
cumstances or conditions; regardless of cir-
cumstances ; not making distinction or differ-
ence. 
"The execution of that decree . . . is equally free 
and irrespective."—South : Sermons, voL viii. , ser. xi i i . 
* 2. Not respectful, not showing respect. 
**Irrever«nd and irrespective behaviour. "—Sir G. C. 
Lewis. (Annandale.) 
^'Irrespective of is used prepositionally in 
the sense of not having regard or respect to; 
leaving out of account: as, Irrespective o/that, 
there are other reasons. 
fcr-res-pect - ive - ly , adv. [Eng. irrespective ; 
-ly.] Without regard to circumstances or con-
ditions. 
" Can he ascribe this reprieve to anything but to 
mercy, to mere undeserved mercy, that places the 
marks of its favour absolutely and irrespectively upon 
-whom i t pleases?"—South : Sermons, vol. vii., ser. IL 
* ir-res'-pir-a-ble, * ir-res-pir'-a-ble, a. g?ref. ir~ = in- (2), and Eng. respirable (q.v.).] 
ot respirable; not fit for respiration. 
* i r -re-spons- i -b i l ' - i - t^s . [Pref. ir- = in-(2), and Eng. responsibility (q.v.).] Want of 
responsibility ; freedom from responsibility. 
Jr-re-spons'-i-ble, a. [Pref. ir- — in- (2), 
and Eng. responsible (q.v.)?] 
1. Not responsible; not answerable; not 
liable to be called to account. 
" They left the crown, what, in the eye and estima-
tion of law, i t had ever been, perfectly irresponsible.'' 
—Burke ; On the French Revolution. 
2. Not trustworthy ; not to be relied on or 
trusted. 
" What a dangerous thing therefore is i t for men to 
intrust such a treasure as their innocence and religion 
i n such irresponsible hands."—Scott: Christian Life, 
pt. i., ch. iv. 
* Jr-re-spons'-X-biy, adv. [Eng. irrespon-
sible); -ly.] In an irresponsible manner; so 
as not to be responsible. 
t ir-re-spons'- ive, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. responsive (q.v.).J Not responsive. 
* fr-renstrain'-a-ljle, a. [Pref. ir- = in-
(2), and Eng. restrainable (q.v.).] That cannot 
be restrained ; incapable of restraint. 
" Irrestrainable, irresistible, or unalterable." — 
Prynne : Treachery & Disloyalty, p . 91. 
* Jr-re-sus'-cit-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in~ 
(2), and Eng. resuscitable (q.v.).J Incapable of 
being resuscitated or revived. 
* fr-re-su3'-cit-a-bly, adv. [Eng. irresus-
citab(le); -ly.] So as not to be capable of re-
suscitation. 
fr-re-ten'-tive, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and 
Eng. retentive (q.v.).] Not retentive; not apt 
to retain : as, an irretentive memory. 
* ir-re-trace'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. retractable (q.v.).] Not retraceable; 
incapable of being retraced. 
fr-re-trieV-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- ~ in- (2), 
and Eng. retrievable (q.v.).] Not retrievable ; 
that cannot be retrieved, recovered, or reme-
died ; irrecoverable, irreparable. 
"Unaffected with irretrievable losses.**— Rambler, 
No. 48. 
Ir-re- tr ieV-a-ble-ness , s. [Eng. irretriev-
able; -ness.] *The quality or state of being 
irretrievable. 
ir-re-triev'-a-bljr, adv. [Eng. irretrieva-
ble); -ly.] Ih an irretrievable manner; irre-
parably, irrevocably. 
"The danger they were in of being irretrievably 
loaf—Sharp: Sermons, voL v. (Pref.) 
' ir-re-turn'-a-ble , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. returnable (q.v.).] Incapable of re-
turning or of being recalled. 
" Forth irretwrnable flieth the spoken word." 
Mirrourfor Magistrates, p. 429. 
* ir-re-veal'-a-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), 
and Eng. revealable (q.v.).] That cannot be 
revealed. 
* ir -re-veal ' -a-bly , adv. [Eng., irreveala-
b(le); -ly.] So*as not to be revealable. 
i r -reV-er-ence , s. [Pr., from Lat. irreve-
rentia, from irreverens = irreverent (q.v.); Sp. 
irreverencia.] 
1. The quality or state of being irreverent; 
want of reverence or veneration; want of a 
due regard or respect for the character, posi-
tion, or authority of a superior; irreverent 
conduct or actions. 
" That is the natural language, the true signification 
and impor t of all irreverence."—South: Sermons, vol. 
ii., ser. a 
* 2. The quality or state of being disregarded 
or treated with disrespect. 
" The irreverence and scorn the judges were Justly 
in."—Clarendon : Civil War. 
* i r -reV-er-end, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and 
Eng. reverend (q.v.).] Irreverent. 
" If any man use immodest speech or irreverend 
gesture."—«S*r#pe: Life of Abp. Qrindal, App. bk. ii. 
i r -reV-er-ent , a. [Fr., from Lat. irreverens, 
from ir- = 'in- = not, and reverens, pr. par. of 
revereor = to revere (q.v.); Sp. & ItaL irreve-
rente.] 
1. Wanting in reverence or respect towards 
the Supreme Being, or any superior; having 
no veneration; disrespectful. 
" Witness the irreverent sou 
Of h im who built the ark." Milton: P. L., xii . 101. 
2. Proceeding from or characterized by ir-
reverence ; expressive of or displaying a want 
of reverence or respect. 
" Dishonouring the grace by irreverent cavils at the 
dispensation."— Warburton: Divine Legation, bk . i i . 
§4. 
ir-reV-er-ent-l$r, adv. [Eng. irreverent; 
-ly.] In an irreverent manner ; without due 
regard or respect. 
"To speak irreverently of God, or to scoff at reli-
gion."—South: Sermons, voL v i i l , ser. 1. 
t Ir-re-vers'- i -ble. a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and 
Eng. reversible (q.v.).] 
1. Not reversible; incapable of being re-
versed or turned the opposite way. 
2. Incapable of being recalled, repealed, or 
annulled; irrevocable, 
"Thisrejection of the Jews, as it is not universal, 
so ne i ther is i t final a n d irreversible."—Jortin: Re-
marks .on EccL Hist. 
t ir -re-vers ' - i -ble-ness , s. [Eng. irrever-
sible; -ness.] The quality or state of being 
irreversible. 
t ir-re-vers-i-bly' , adv. [Eng. irreversib{le); 
-ly.] In an irreversible manner; so as to be 
irreversible; irrevocably. 
" Many myriads of solifldians have stumbled, and 
fallen irreversibly.''—Hammond : Works, L 462. 
* ir-rev-o-ca-bi l ' - i - ty , s. [Eng. irrevocable; 
-ity.] The quality or state of being irrevocable. 
i r -reV-6-ca-ble , * i r - r e V - 6 - k a - b l e , a. 
[Fr., from Lat. revocabilis, from ir'- = in- = 
not, and revocabilis — revocable (q.v.); Sp. irre-
vocable ; ItaL irrevocabile. ] Not revocable; 
incapable of being revoked or recalled; that 
cannot be reversed, repealed, or annulled; 
irreversible, unalterable. 
" Wrathful Jove's irrevocable doom, 
Transfers the Trojan state to Grecian hands." 
Dryden : Virgil; sEneid i i . 489. 
Ir-reV-6-ca-ble-ness , s. [Eng. irrevoea-
bleness.] The quality or state of being irrevo 
cable. 
Ir-rev'-oc-a-bl^, adv. [Eng. irrevocabQe); 
-ly.] In an irrevocable manner ; in a mannei 
not admitting of repeal or recall; beyond 
recall. 
" I pledge my word, irrevocably past," 
Byron : tfisus & Euryalus. 
* i r -reV-6-ka-ble , a. [IRREVOCABLE.] 
* i r -reV-6- lu-ble , a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2\ 
and Eng. revoluble (q.v.). J That cannot roll 
or turn round; not revolving; having n€ 
rotatory motion. 
" Progressing the dateless and irrevoluble circle ot 
eternity [theyjshall clasp inseperable hands."—Milton i 
On the Reform, in England, bk. i i 
* ir-rhe-toV-ic-al , a. [Pref. ir- — in- (2), 
and Eng. rhetorical (q.v.).] Not rhetorical; 
unpersuasive. 
IT - r i -gate , v.t. [Lat. irrigatus, pa. par. of ir* 
rigo = to moisten, to irrigate : in = on, upon, 
and rigo = to moisten ; Ital. irrigare.] 
* 1. To water, to wet; to fill with a fluid or 
liquid. 
" We say that bloud, coming to a part to irrigate It. 
is . . . at length transmuted into the nature of that 
part."—Digby: 0/Bodies, en. xxiv. 
* 2. To moisten. 
" Their frying blood compels to irrigate 
Their dry-furred tongues." 
J. Philips : Cider, bk . H. 
3. To water, as land, by causing a stream to 
flow and spread over it. 
lr-ri-ga'-t ion, s. [Lat. irrigatio, from irrir 
gatus, pa. par. of irrigo = to irrigate (q.v.);, 
Fr. irrigation ; Ital. irrigazione.] 
L Ord. Lang.: In the same sense as IL 1. 
IL Technically: 
1. Agric.: The act of watering land by 
causing a stream to flow and spread over it. 
"This way of irrigation may by a cheap and easy 
mechauical contrivance be very much improved."— 
Boyle : Works, iii . 4i7. 
2. Med.: The art or operation of making 
water trickle over an inflamed wound or othei 
portion of the body morbidly affected. 
* Xr-rig'-U-OUS, a. [Lat. irriguus = irriga-
ting, from irrigo = to irrigate ; Ital. irriguo.} 
1. Watery, watered. 
"Theflow*rylap 
Of some irriguous valley spread her store." 
MiUon : P. L., iv. 268. 
2. Penetrating gently, as water into the< 
earth. 
" Rash Elpenor . . . thought 
To exhale his surfeit by irriguous sleep." 
Philips': Cider, bk . IL 
* Ir-riS'-i-ble, a. [Pref. ir- = in- (2), and 
Eng. risible (q.v.).] Not risible; not capable 
of laughter. 
* ir-ri'-sion, s. [Fr., from Lat. irrisionem* 
ace. of irrisio = a laughing at, from irrisus^ 
pa. par. of irrideo — to laugh a t : iu- = at, 
and rideo = to laugh ; Sp. irrision; Ital. irri-
sione.] The act of laughing at or mocking-
another; mockery, derision. 
" Then he againe, by way of irrision. Ye say vers 
true indeed."—P. Holland : Suetonius, p. 212. 
ir-rit-a-bil'-i-ty» «• [Fr- irritabilite, from 
Lat. irritabilitatem, ace of irritabilitas, from 
irritabilis = irritable (q.v.); Sp. irritabilidad; 
Ital. irritabUitd.] 
1. Ord. Lang.: The quality or state of being 
irritable or easily provoked Or irritated; sus-
ceptibility to irritation; petulance. 
" During some hours his gloomy irritability kept his 
servants, his courtiers, even his pr' ts, in terror.**— 
Macaulay : Hist. Eng., ch. xxi . 
IL Technically: 
L Anat. (Of a muscle): Vital contractibility, 
the property of visibly contracting, even after 
death, on the application of a stimulus. It 
varies in duration according to the muscle 
irritated. The right auricle has been found 
irritable for sixteen and a half hours after 
death. A voluntary muscle has been found 
irritable twenty-four hours after death. The 
great physiologist Albert Von Haller directed 
much attention to the subject of irritability. 
2. Bot.: Excitability of an extreme character, 
in which an organ exhibits movements different 
from those commonly met with in plants. Its 
known causes are three—atmospheric pressure, 
spontaneous motion, and the contact of other 
bodies. Thus plants sleep, the compound 
leaves, where such exist, folding together; so 
also the sensitive plant shrinks from touch. 
boll, b6y; pout, joltrl; cat, 9011, chorus, chin, bench; go, gem;thin, {his; sin, a s ; expect, Xenophon, exist. ph = t 
-dan, -tlan = shan. -tion, -sion = shun; -(ion, -sion = zhun. -cious, -tious, -sious = shus. -ble, -die, &c = beL del. 
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IRR i a a i s i 
The ' v -^Uy oi aB-REP-RE-HENS'I-BLB-NESS, n, 
feeing irreprehenslble. 
1R-REP-RE-HENS'1-BL7, <u2o. In s a&nncr not to 
incur blame ; w uhout Maine. -Sherwood. 
f R-REF-RE-fcENT'A-BLE, «. [«« and represent.] Not 
lo be represented ; that cap not be figured or repre-
sented by any image. S&Kw> <?jie«f» 
2R-RE-PRESS'I-BLE, a. [in and repressive.) Tha t 
can not be repre°seG, 
*R-RE V' 3R- -Jl ICE, >i. {L, 
teviia See RsvEREfccE.j 
«d ;« 
i. W a n t of reverence, or want of veneration ; wont | 
cf a" Gue regard to the actho-ity and c* ^rccter of ihe 
Supreroc 8eitia> Irreverence toward Govt *J a-ia^ogous J 
3 Y© increase action or violence $ to hightev 9$ 
citowenl in, 
Air, if »ery coM, irntaieth the flame. JKxfcr, 
4. In prvewlogy, to produce irritation, WJI!CD cec 
' R I - T A T E , pari, a. Kxcited j hightened, 
ue state cf In "g <SfW0i«,anJ*d ; applied f'» ^un. j I E ' R I - T A - T E D , pp. or a. Excited ; provoked j rub-
But t h u word ic s n p ^ p / . ttely applicable to the Su- ! jected to irritation. 
preme Bei.i£, and to his l&wn JW.U instt ' tlioc*, I IR'RI-TX-TING, ppr. or a, Excit ing; angering; ?f> 
J^-RE-PRESS'I-BLY, aA«. In ft mdnaer or degree ! iF-EEyjE.R-5.NT, a. [Fr. ; **and ro»«r«j/.] W e n t - j vofc.ng; canning irntation. 
th.it can nr* be repressed. ) ing in reverence and v^rctatjon ; not entertaining cr i )R-FJ-'L,A'T10L\. n. _Ihe operation of esciting heaS 
•manifesting dae rega~d to the Suprarne Bern/. 
- - - - - - e\pjers.ve of a 
reprf 
IR-P.E-PRCACH'A-ELE, c. tin an« reloadable.] \ 
That can net be justly reproached ; free front* blame, Proceed. Jig from irreverence 
want of veneration , as, »c v^tncreitf thougnt, word, 
or on-ase, 
?. Wanting Jn rc**p-»ct 1» ^uperuro. Millar. 
IB-REV'ER-EMT-LY, atv. Wi t twi t due re,nrd to 
the aulhor'ty and cs nrac;ej of tl»e Sbuprdrne Being, 
in an ipevereut manner. 
9. Without due reaped ro 6':pcri<trc. 
IR-RE-VERS'f~Bi.E, a. { i - and »*«>«•*(&•.] That cm" 
provable.) J nai can nos oer jusuy reprovea j oiaine- j not be reversed ; that can not be ^cal led, repealed, 
ISo* ; upright. * of annulled ; us an irrej'rsibl: decree or sentence. 
IR-R£-V£R&'l-LhE-*«ES. J , ». Btc^ts of being m e -
* verslble. 
IE-RE-VEBS'I-BLY, <irfo. In a manner which pre-
cludes a revQ7?:i"t or r^rea!* 
IR-REV*-0-€A-BXL'X-TY, \ w. State of boing Irrev-
IR-REVO-fA-BLTR KES3 f f ocable, 
IR-REVO-6A-BLE, c f f r , from L. incvocabilb} in 
and revoeabxlvs. reooco ; re and ws<7, to call.] 
Not to be recalled orie^oJced, that can not be re-
versed, repealed, or a"n>jM«jd ; as, an irrevocable de-
cree, sentence, edict, or doom} irrevocable f.ite ; an 
irrevocable prom 3-e. Mdtoiu Dry den. 
.upright: innocent. An irreproachablelifs U the high-
est h«mor cf £ rot*onai being, 
IR-RE-PRdACirA-B^J^-NESS, «. T h s qiwJUy or i 
sl i ts cf neinf? noi repiocchabie. 
IR-rtE-PR3'*»C""H'A-BLY, itrfu. in © manner not to 
deserve -aproach ', blamelessly; a3j deportment brre 
proaehzN'i «pr»ght. 
IR-RJS-PROV'A-BLE, (-proov,'a~bi,) a. [in and re-
rr»;afclc] Th t a t b tl d bl m
j o j t . 
lR-RE-PROV'A-BL¥,©fo. So as not to he iinbie to 
repioof cr blame. Wetter, 
IE-R&I > -Tl"TI0U8, (-tish'cs,) c Secretly introduced. 
Jfiehols. 
IR-RE-SIST'ANCE, a. [in and resistance.} Forbear-
ance to resist j non-re3iStance } passive bubmission. 
Foley. 
IR-RE-ST&T-I-BILrI-TY, \ n. ffrom »T«wf{feZ?.) The 
IR-RE-S 1ST' I-BLE-NESS, S qu^l ity of bei ng irrss 1st. 
ible; pov/er cr force beycai resistance or opposition-. 
^ Hammond, ; 
IR-RE-SIST'I-BLE, «» [Vr.; in and resistible, See 
That car> TJO* be rpwjQn&dnWj izhhied or opposed; 
cuperior to opposition. 
An hresUSbls law of our natura Irapcla us to neek h?pa?n«sB. 
J. M, Mason. 
IR-RE-SIST'T-BLY, adv. With a power that can aot 
be successfully resisted or opposed. Dryden, 
TR-RE-$IST'LESS, a. That can not be resisted. 
GlGnvitts, 
IR-RES^O-LU-BLE, a. JL. in &nd resolvo.] 
.Not to bo dissolved ; incapable of dissclueton, 
Boyle. 
IR-RES'O-LTJ-BEE-NESS, «. The Quality of bQin% 
indissolub'e j ret^ jstarjCQ to septr&tion of parts by 
bent, Boyle, 
IR-RES'C-LUTS. e, [in tind resolute.] Not firm or 
constant m purpose; not decided ; not determined ; 
wavering; given to drubt. Irresolute men either re-
solve not at"all, or resolve nnd re re«olve. 
IR-REIB'O-LUTE-LY, adv. Without firmasaa of mind j 
v/ithout decision 
SR-RES'O-LUTE-NESS, ru Wagj of grra determina-
tion or purpose ; vacillation of rhind. 
XR-RES-C-LO'TXGN, is. [F r . ; u» and resolutio-n.) 
Vffm.% of resolution ; wan t of de'cision m p'irpossi 
s. tiuctuatioa oframd, zs i s *5&ub4, or between nopp 
and fe vr. Jtdd>sovf 
IR-KE SOLV-A-«fL fT-7 Y, } rt. The slate or qu*»«y 
CR-RE-£OltV''A-BL:-i NESS. \ of aot be.'og rrcoira-
b<f. 
fR-RE-£OLV i -BLS, «. Ti A* ca« DO: IV resolve/!. 
IR-Rli-SOLV'^JD-LY, ?ft'*- *«» and rcscitJ^] W.tfr-
oi't ssttiid vc«.*j2**zifiat.o "•« ^i^iifo H^ed] Boyle. 
IR-RE-SPEfeT'XVB, a. [in nhd r«vee£n;9.1 Not" hav-
ing regard t o ; With 4>/>* &Sj trresp^cftse of conso-
quesce^. 
&, Kot regarding circumstances, [ Obs.^ 
ACcorOn^ *o ih j CoCvT>rs, it r i r i i ba S"tciv3ti vruollv Sntn t*ie 
abso.uta, *rref/>s^4w wi!! si GoU. i^ca?:. 
JR-RE S P S e T T / S - L Y . cdv, Without regprd tu; not 
IR-RES^Pi-RA-BLB, «. f»u a»d rtsptr&k.] CJafift for 
respuation j r.ot 'ncViiag ti,5 qualities T*i*xc?i suppsrf 
anijinl life ; c?, fr~S3pr£-\l$ a m 
2R-RE-SPOK3-:- i i I i^i-T; , «, r / d L 
J^-
actson, and r?dnfc33,ln the skin or fiesfe of living an 
imals, by friction o" other means. 
2. The excitement of action, in the asi"nal «s>^  
it'm, by t!ie apphretion of food, medicsnef, and \ht> 
l i k e . 
3. Eultemsij t of an^ei cr passion - pj-ovecat'^o', 
exc*ptfi«itwn ; ?ng f . 
4
. In r-'i sioUt y, u vituted and abnorma* «?en^at ^n 
or action, o? tot'js m conjunction, produced by n^t .-
raK mndicinal, or <r*echdniLaI ngeut^, either upon ar. 
unhealthy state, of ths vital susceptibilities, cr h} «T* 
exr^>,35ye or otherwise impiop3i use or apphcatiou 
of the satural, raedic.nal, or mechamcai agent-*. 
IR 'RI-TA-TIVE, a. Serving to sicite or fariute. 
5. AcLonapacied v/»tb or produced by increased 
action or itTitation 5 as, an imtatws fever- Darojin* 
XR'RI-TA-TO-RY, c Bxcit>ng, producing i r n t a f o ^ 
which see. Hale*. 
IB-RO-RA'TION, n. [U hroralh ? ir and ra*,] 
The act of bedewing, the state of being moistened 
with d.'W. Bpaliamaniy Trans. 
IR-RUP'TED, a. [L. irruptns.] Broken with v i ^ 
i^nce. 
IK-RE V O - € A-BLY. cdv* Beyond recall ^ fax a. QOAA- i tR-RUP 'TION, v^ {Fx^ ftoui L . irras&o i H aadra .a^ 
ner precluding repeal. 
IR-RE-VCK'A-BLE, a. [fa and rezokable.'l Not to 
be recalled ; irrevocable." JiaiaU Res. 
IR-RT V'O-LU-Bl.E, a, TJiat has no revolution. [AW 
t'-ic 1 vtfilton. 
IR 'R; G S T E ? « , t [L. irrigoi in and ri^o, to wa-
ter.] 
h To water} to wet^ to moisten; to hedew, 
* Ray, 
% To water, as land, by causing a stream to flow 
upon it and spread over it. 
IX 'RI-Ga-TFO, pp. Watered ; moistened. 
I R ' R I - G A - T I M G J ppr. Wa te r ing ; wet t ing; moisten-
ing. 
I R . - R I - G A ^ I O N J 7^ T h e act of watering or moisten-
"ing. $ 
A2„ In atrdeulture.ihe operation^of causing water to 
fi§r«vtfra^ffS^nourShmg plant?. 
IR-RIG'U-OUS, a, [L. frr*^«««w. See IRRIOATEC] 
1. Watered j Eatery i «nou.t. 
Tb* So>v€xy lap 
0? some irriguous rsXtej E r^eaJa bar «tow. Milton. 
%. D e ^ y ; moi-:U Philips, 
tR-RXS'IQK, (.r-riKD'uft,),??. [L» trw*«j, '^mafc; tnond 
r«f«f, t o ia'ij?^.^ 
The act o* la.iphirg at c -»ther. iroodzvard, 
I ^ - R I - T A - B f l / X l V , K. ."- - ww*iilfc] S'.8c«i/t^ 
Mhty of excitement; si 'i. ' -y cf being easily irri-
tated or CKasperaiod , c-, *"• '-;' ' \ ' of tenrp^r. 
2 In phvsMe/fy. (IS h *'<-a.a -•] i::s.] cosce^bilisy 
to the loflueate of »n lu i^ j sieujcnaJ, end mechani-
cal agents, and the \joxvef of responding in a Rcniiti 
manner, fcotb by «en«rfiuo2!S and actions. (S.) A njor-
bid nr d ol&inly exeesaive vital suae eptibUity to ti" ' 
zX of re-fDASibsS-
Nos lR-RE-SI'0J<5'M«Lr. «. [£n a*d r.v^sr^Z^.] 
re3pan3ibl3 ? i.ot liacls cr ablg to answer i'02'co^e-
qnc^'ios: r.ct stOT/crcMc 
IR-RE-SPGKST-BLY. <?A £c? s* wo* to t.: ras./^s:-
Me. 
JS-RU-2UfC7-TA:-B t-S, e, Tot ccpiMo r/" t ^ <s rs 
I R - P V E - 3 C £ J ' C : - T . V £ I J 7 , CCV. SO aa r o t to re r ' . o ^ . 
citable, 
rR-Rr_-VL]NT'i1 Hj 4. Wet Ktcavif 3 r? epc c«» r-t :«. 
IR-RE-TTl.TCI/A-FIt;, «. Tfjc%* «?n r e t be r e t r i e d . 
tR-UE-TRfiiVA-rtli i l , e. fi% »nd rtsrl&xtVe, ft":as re-
t««« . j l ie: to £ J recovered or repuirod; U»oso'/ena-
ble J Ktcp'rpWc ; 3.3, s« irretrievable iosd. 
CR-RE T X < L V I A - I » I « S J ? E S R J , r . T h e stato of being 
irtetj:<!V5il!c. 
IS-RE-T£)IBV'A-iLr . afe. IfTepar&b!/; Jnccovera-
hjy; iv a ir.^Q.^r net to be re£v.&ed. * lYoodtstrd. 
fa .R5-TrjR.TA-nLE f a. 2^U 43 be re turned 
IR-y 1>V KAX/A-C^E, c Tha t m3V sot fed revealed. 
IR~RE»V2AIM-Ri/x, <zde. So as not to bo raveaiabie. 
po, to break or burst, j 
1. A bursting i n ; a breaking, or sndden, violent 
rushing into a place. Holland has been ofte?x man-
dated by irrvpiions of the sea. 
% A sudden invasion or incursion ; a sudden, r,o 
lent inroad, or entrance of invaders into a place a% 
country ; as, the irruption of the northern nations 
into France and Ita'y. 
TR-RUF'TXVE, o, Rushing in or upon. 
IS, v. i. [Sax. UJJ G. Lt; D. » , L. esti Gr, tar* 1 
Sans, asft; Pers. 5s2 or hist.] 
The third person singular of the substantive v« r&, 
which is com posed of thres or four d.stinct ro<»ts^  
which Eppear in tho words en. be, are, and ts. ?* 
and iras coincide with the Latin esse, and Goth. y&-
san. In the Judicative, present tense, it h thu* 
varied ; i am, thou art, he, she, or rt, ts ; we, j e or 
you. they, ere. £0 writing and speakmp, JIv vo-,i.d 
is often dreppud i as, he*s gone j there's none ieft, 
XS'A-BEL,«/ [ F A tviaV.\] 
Isabel yeuov? i3 a brovi&ish ye^lcw, witft t. shzd* 
of brown job rea, jET*rwu.,s, 
I-SA-GOC-'IS, )
 r - , , * 
r-sA-audTdjiL, j & '',a?- • '«w**-J 
Xn^cductory. Chegortj* 
f'SA-GO&f, v. [Cr. u ^ s , equal, a n t v«»vsa> an angis*] 
A nff»i"5 «hK*£ angles ere ?»r.*<a?. 
[fy A-TI&, c, X*. iy»lt,gyt the asctic fos, 07 Can is ia%> 
pus. ^ E/»cyrt 
XS^/XII-?*_ iC, («3- tf,e*-ac*Hs,) c [/.- ischUidicw*, from 
ischias, !5»e «^crf»«a, ficra ISCVUT^ the ».ip , Gr, e»xi«u> 
J'eitain';.? to tne feu*. T r e ie-"hiadic pscoios i^-
&5se99e i? "»;a!%ed by Cutltz: wUh rh?»pjnt^isi73. It is 
i&euniaMo or fieuralgic aifeclicn cf *o«ae par? 
ana a cnp?brt ?y of respond w e <*Jy by y i ttetsG and j l s . € Z l C - ; i E T ' i G , (xs-kM-re^ik.) c r & « XWHI 
abnormal sensations and ftct'ooa, \ . z. * * . - , -
Tbi', term 0 c-iso wod *n «cih of tho prec^i'ir.sr ? » B-jrir<f toe <\u«lky c? rei-evir*5 ischory. jfE-Oiii-'REir* 10 , r« .a medic no adapted to r r t ie i* 
to coa;fBdi,ti3.tH>n from i 4v$&X, $**&*? * IC t . w x « P « c , f r c « » ^ ^ 
to stop. Rr.a ojipoy, nuns , ] 
A ctjp;a*g>} ar cuppressicis of 3r!ne; dlf^erenf f ro^ 
accepijtions, v.-"ith (be lac ta t ion of con^p-ern^nt to • 
suscopuWity of acaoJi^ t to coatradi»li3ution f ro" ' 
esr.-iatloas. Tally, j 
IP- F.X-TA-SL33, <?. r^ ?eT» » - ikr&l Buaceptit le of es-1 
citemei*-. 01 cf heat ar*d sacnadj, an animal bodieac { I D<-U6v, 
ilair.ed or€S03psrate<-i t &ci, er* t'j,-»•!:{*(» temper, 
3. Li pbyzioZ'jgy, -- i sc r t ib le c f imtatioa, which 
ace. 
la g»ivr»i, tla.-a I» n v l i : ^ i">."i^/< $1 ih$ a r l n r l bedy, bat 
WZ'-TA-hh"; t J A ^ a ' r r i ' sVc n ^ » r e r , 
iR ' i r -TAi-r-CY, -», T'*» k'-fctfe cX v:eiss, unUrct. 
IR 'RI -TANT. c. Irritating* 
la 'RX-TANT. JU Aa 85;eiil, whether r ^ u r ? J , eiedici-
n?i, or lilechanicaj, v-ticii preoac^? vUiotsd a i d sb-
uo'mr» senaa'wons and fcct*cns, m a parr or the wh^Is 
of ass amraaJ iryata>i». Tally.-
UL'ftJ-YZTZ, v. L {t, *-i-ifn t *< and Hs, wrath j V17. 
tree, oungencyj KMS:SP, r«f c 3 ©? perliapo mora- prop-
erly f*ora"S',v« f : c , to nrov^^o j G. rauxn tc tickle, 
veihecte., irrita:o,J , . . . 
3. To excite heat end r^aness in the tivin o? flesi 
of J i v a c airinai bcd»s , tA &y frictioa j to inflaa-e j 
to fre>; ftff, to i?r<^z^ ft tfo^nded pari by a cossrae 
U. To ezeito a n w ; to provnse; to t ea s s , to en-
a«*perate. I'l3ver *./ti«ic * c'nld tor tridmg faoits. 
Thd iflsoIoB-? r f 3 f:*r T t ^ 5 I £ M hie subjects. 
i •eye* 
l<x. $^pr* iron,' IL'Z-miJZ., 
.> vr-wJ/ cf <&n:fe ere, a compound cf orvi ct 
*rc.n a:ui t»-.4r.:i asrJ. J&si.o. 
i : -I, a f j7-r.?*-«.\:nn of-Er*g!!s1i vr^rds, 55, in Sax* i*^, 
2V-' „ v. - , ! . , ' , . 4 , a;:J ro t irfprobai/iy it !3 U.s ter»n> 
"i .«" i t is?'*, t'i l'lenci), £3 in groiesguei lU cscc, ir> 
- cC--'--c.^'t :'; i L i t i s terra'sau^r, 0/th-3 u.ceptas 
» . t j , ? j t',/-j"v.\3?. Annexed t^ English ziju'tives^ 
t *« dcrtotcj. 'j:r».r.Jticn, Qi a &iaali dsgrcs of ti% ^ 
/?/isrs-iesod to narie& fonni t j^s'.easlvo acjicu-w*. 
£- in S-ccdtshj Pcm^sh, English, 
Ish &nne^cd to coaimon uo^R3 forms an Bdjecti'''* 
i-Jiotlag s partiiipsSica of the qualities e^^re&ssd bv 
t^e -noun, as foofish^ from ,/w)/* r o ^ r ^ i , f-' m rogue. 
brj^nk, from b*~Ktc Thn & tb& mere common i»eo 
of th«« termination, 
I 'SI C?-iE, «. A pcsdact ehoct of ice, is more gen*-
erali) wn^.aa X C C L S , [Sec Ses and ICICLS.] 
I , '3IN / 'GLASS, (I'zir.g-glass9) n. . [Tha t is . is?-or fcv-
^-t.iss.] A eiibtJ^Lce consisting chief?/ of gelat'n. oj 
afirnrt texture and whitisb eoior, p^paured t^o^a t^s 
F A T J E , F A S , F ^ L L , W H ^ T , - H 2 T £ , r a e Y . - ? £ » £ • MASUtHE. B S U X - N G T & WJVF« MOVE. W Q L F , $QQ^~~ 
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INTRODUCTION 
large quantities of sediment, many samples taken 
carrying from five to twenty per cent of solid 
matter. A doubt exists as to whether they may 
not fill so rapidly as to end their usefulness within 
a brief period. No reservoir filled with water so 
heavily laden with sediment can be perpetually 
maintained without some means of sluicing out the 
silt deposited. It will not do to establish homes 
and create communities under reservoirs which will 
in time become simply deposits of mud. This 
danger does not menace storage works in the 
northern part of the arid region. The waters of 
Snake River have emptied into Jackson Lake for 
centuries without filling it up; Yellowstone Lake is 
a natural reservoir of the Yellowstone River, and 
has been for untold ages, yet the sediment deposited 
has not materially diminished its size, and hundreds 
of similar illustrations might be added. 
The importance of irrigation in the arid region is 
not to be measured solely by the value of the crops 
grown, but as well by the influence a home-grown 
food-supply will exert on the growth and prosperity 
of other industries. It must be kept in mind that, 
while many of the irrigated areas are small, they 
are the nuclei around which cluster the industries 
of vast outlying districts. They furnish the hay, 
grain, and vegetables for the mining camp, and are 
an insurance against destructive losses of range 
live stock in winter. Without irrigation, the region 
which separates the humid sections of the Atlantic 
and Pacific coasts would be a far more disagreeable 
9 
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CHAPTER X 
IRRIGATION IN UTAH 
WHEN the Mormon emigrants started on their lone-
some journey across the arid wastes of the uninhab-
ited West, their first thought was to find a home so re-
mote from human settlement that they could follow 
their religious beliefs and practices without being 
interfered with. Locating in an unknown desert, 
in a region without established government, and 
where there was question whether sovereignty lay 
in the United States or Mexico, they had to begin 
at the foundation in building their commonwealth. 
Irrigation was necessary because crops could not 
be grown without it, and it was only through agri-
culture that they could be saved from starvation. 
The leader of these pioneers, with wisdom if not 
inspiration, made agriculture the foundation in-
dustry of his people. In this respect, the begin-
nings of Utah were different from those of every 
other arid State. Here, agriculture was from the 
first the principal industry; in many of the others 
it was, at the outset, a mere incident. Because of 
its paramount importance, the laws and customs 
under which it was developed had early a careful 
consideration and took a different trend from the 
beginnings in other States. Colorado and Califor-
nia borrowed their early water laws and customs 
from the miners; Utah made hers first hand. The 
220 
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IRRIGATION IN UTAH 
was treated as belonging to nobody and open to 
appropriation without any legal formality. The 
county selectmen who composed the county court 
were not to hear petitions and grant rights, but 
were to hear and determine claims and settle dis-
putes. This was held to be a judicial function and 
rendered the law void. It was, however, enforced 
in a number of counties in the Territory, where 
the irrigators presented their claims to the com-
missioners and received certificates of their rights. 
As this law is void, these certificates have no 
value, except to show that certain rights existed at 
the time of their issuance. 
In 1897 Utah abandoned the distinctive features 
of its early irrigation law to copy those common to 
the arid States. This law provides that rights to 
the use of the unappropriated waters of the State 
may be acquired by appropriation, and that the 
appropriator must post and file a notice of the 
intended diversion. It further provides that per-
sons who had acquired rights before the passage 
of the act "may file for record a declaration of 
their rights " ; but that the failure to file this dec-
laration will not cause a forfeiture. The purpose 
of this law, here as elsewhere, was to provide a 
permanent record of all rights to water. Before 
its passage the entire flow of most of the streams 
of the State was appropriated, and as the record-
ing of such rights is made optional, the law has 
proven of no practical use. Outside of this, it is 
of little value, because there is no restriction upon 
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pends—population and a common source of water supply— 
are non-existent in other parts of the State. 
An increase in population of over twenty thousand within 
the seven years following i860 presaged the enactment of 
laws regulating water rights by the territorial legislature. 
Every year the area of land for which water was needed had 
been constantly increasing, and the available supply of 
water had been constantly diminishing. Colonization and 
cultivation had extended so far that the point had been 
reached where the water would not serve all the land under 
cultivation. Accordingly, acts were passed by the terri-
torial legislatures of 1864, 1865, 1866 regulating the distri-
bution of water and placing it within the control of the 
irrigators themselves.1 The principle was established that 
those farmers who first made use of the water should ever 
afterwards be entitled to sufficient water to irrigate the 
amount of land originally cultivated by them, and that later 
comers, whenever scarcity occurred, should not take the 
water until those enjoying prior rights had satisfied their 
needs, the latest comers being the first to be deprived, and 
those settling before them losing their water supply in 
succession as it became less and less. For convenience the 
rights were not held in the exact order of settlement, but 
were divided into classes, all the individuals of one class 
or group sharing the water according to their respective 
claims.* This system of vested rights was known as the 
"priority of right system," and embraced three distinct 
classes—primary, secondary and tertiary. 
Primary rights were acknowledged to have vested and 
accrued: (1) Whenever any person had taken, diverted and 
used any of the unappropriated water of any natural stream 
or other natural source of supply; (2) whenever any person 
or persons had enjoyed the open, peaceable, uninterrupted 
and continuous use of water for a period of seven years. 
Secondary rights were acknowledged to have vested and 
accrued: (1) Whenever the whole of the water of any stream, 
1
 Utah Compiled Laws, 879. Wheeler's Surveys, 1872, 28-33. 
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CHAPTER I. 
ADVANTAGES OF RECLAIMING THE REMAINING IRRIGABLE 
LAND. 
Any discussion of problems arising from the contemplated 
reclamation of arid land should be prefaced by a considera-
tion of the reasons justifying the economic expediency of 
such an undertaking. Advantages which make irrigation 
desirable in Utah apply with equal force to the other States 
and territories of the arid region; hence, a consideration of 
the utility of irrigation based on Utah's experience pos-
sesses more than a local interest A review of the econ-
omic history of the Mormon people warrants the following 
conclusions as to the benefits which the reclamation of irri-
gable lands confers: 
First, irrigation promotes better methods of agriculture. 
a. By introducing the small farm unit Whatever the 
difference is as to water control and administration, all the 
States and Territories in the arid region have the common 
tendency of reducing their farm areas/ Physical configur-
ation contributes largely to this result There are so many 
small areas most valuable for facility and access to water 
to be found within the inter-mountain region, that subdivi-
sion is a necessity. But the real philosophy of the small 
farm is found in the fact that it introduces elements of cer-
tainty in agriculture never known before. There is abso-
lute assurance of harvesting the crop. There is the ability 
to so widely diversify the products of the farm as to provide 
almost everything the family consumes. There is the scope 
for science and intelligence to work out the best possible 
1The average size of the Utah irrigated farm is 27 acres; the 
mean average for the Arid Region, 67 acres. Cf. nth Census, 
Agriculture by Irrigation, 1. 
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result, and so secure the largest return from each acre and 
the nearest approach to perfection in quality. Finally, lone-
liness is banished from country life, because the possibilities 
of social enjoyment multiply in the ratio of subdivision of 
area. 
b. By fostering intelligent farming. High intelligence 
and scientific accuracy must be brought into play in the 
investigation and development of water supply, and in the 
construction of works for storage and distribution. Irriga-
tion means (i) the power to apply water exactly when 
needed; (2) the power to apply water in precisely the right 
quantities; (3) the power to give some one crop water and 
to withhold it from another; (4) the power to obtain in any 
year diversified crops in one locality. These requirements 
are evidences that if the water is to be utilized so as to sat-
isfy the demand of irrigators, scientific methods must be 
pursued. In short, agriculture and horticulture by irriga-
tion exhibit the same tendency to specialization character-
istic of the recent development of all trades and industries. 
This specialization puts a premium on brains. 
c. By encouraging the production of special crops. This 
follows as a natural corollary from the introduction of the 
small farm unit Reclamation of arid lands means not so 
much a competition with the farmers of other sections as it 
does the creation of special crops of an important commer-
cial character; accompanied by the formation of home mar-
kets, by the necessary development of mines, by the ex-
ploitation of salt, onyx and other deposits, by the building 
of towns and factories, by the construction of railroads, and 
by the increased importance of the West pastoral and timber 
industries. 
d. By abolishing the autocratic control of water. An 
important result of irrigation, as practiced in the United 
States, has been a readjustment of opinions as to the limit 
of ownership in what may be termed "natural" wealth. 
The historical law of aridity is beyond question. It is that 
in every country subject thereto in such a degree as to 
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require the construction of works, the storage of water 
therein, and the artificial distribution and application of the 
same to the soil before cultivation can be made a success, 
the natural wealth thus created in water must remain 
public in character, subject to the control of the users and 
beneficiaries thereof, and be at all times under the adminis-
tration of law and local authorities.1 
A denial of the quality of personal property in water is a 
more or less distinctive feature of the jurisprudence of the 
arid regions. Water not being capable of identification, 
nor found in place, has none of the elements which legally 
distinguish property. In ancient times the central or sover-
eign authority was the autocratic source controlling water 
supplies for irrigation purposes;" but in the United States 
the tendency is toward direct State supervision with muni-
cipal control and regulation.* The immediate result of this 
socialism, as opposed to autocracy, in the use of water has 
been to prevent conflicts arising between the supplier and 
applier of water, for in the former case the applier takes as 
much water as he wants and pays for what he uses. 
Second, irrigation through the introduction of improve-
ments in the methods of agriculture promotes commerce 
and stimulates business.4 
a. By largely increasing the produce of the land, so re-
ducing the actual labor required to raise a given quantity 
of the produce. This would be true even if made on the 
supposition that conservative farmers will for years go on in 
the same ruts, arid after securing water will not otherwise 
change their practices. However, there is every reason to 
hope for the passage of such water laws in Utah as will in-
1
 Gould on Waters, Sec. 46-79-
* Justinian's Institutes, 2 Tit. Is., 4. 
* Kinney on Irrigation, Water Rights, Appropriation of Waters, 
Sec. 54; Bracton, Liber 1, Ch. 22, pp. 7-8; Angell on Water Courses, 
Sec. 551. 
4
 In the development of this argument, helpful suggestions were 
received from an address by Donald W. Campbell before the Third 
Annual Convention of the Nebraska State Irrigation Association. 
(Cf. Nebraska Annual, 1896, 42.) 
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